SSA\u27s Development Delay: Three Essays on The Monetary System, The International Trade and Property Rights by Lohi, Julie
Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports 
2012 
SSA's Development Delay: Three Essays on The Monetary System, 
The International Trade and Property Rights 
Julie Lohi 
West Virginia University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Lohi, Julie, "SSA's Development Delay: Three Essays on The Monetary System, The International Trade and 
Property Rights" (2012). Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 149. 
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/149 
This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research 
Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is 
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain 
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license 
in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses, 
Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU. 
For more information, please contact researchrepository@mail.wvu.edu. 
SSA's Development Delay: Three Essays 
on The Monetary System, The 
International Trade and Property Rights 
Julie Lohi 
Dissertation submitted to the 
College of Business and Economics 
at West Virginia University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in 
Economics 
Shuichiro Nishioka, Ph.D., Chair 
Ronald Balvers, Ph.D. 
Arabinda Basistha, Ph.D. 
Andrew Young, Ph.D. 
Walker Todd, Ph.D. 
Department of Economics 
Morgantown, West Virginia 
2012 
Keywords: Sub-Saharan Africa; Exchange Rate Regime; Inflation; CFA franc 
Currency Union; Regional Trade; Gravity Equation; Heckscher-Ohlin; Increasing 




SSA's Development Delay: Three Essays on The Monetary System, The International 
Trade and Property Rights 
Julie Lohi 
This dissertation focuses on the issues of economic performances in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). It includes three essays on the monetary system, the international trade and 
property rights. 
The first chapter discusses the inflation dynamics across different exchange rate 
regime groups in SSA. In particular, a comparative analysis is conducted between the 
CFA franc currency union countries and the non-members of SSA to see whether the 
CFA franc countries exhibit lower inflation in the short and the long run compared to 
other countries. This chapter also assesses the money supply growth, output growth and 
money velocity growth as the sources of inflation in the region. The empirical results 
support the inflation- growth trade-off in the CFA zones. While the CFA countries 
experience relatively lower inflation in the short and the long run, they suffer from a 
pronounced output loss relative to all other non -CFA countries in general and relative 
to the pegged non-CFA countries in particular. 
The second chapter analyses the implications of the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) theory 
of factor abundance and the increasing return to scale (IRS) theory of product differ-
entiation in the bilateral trade within SSA. It shows that the similarity of the factors 
of production proportions and the lack of product differentiation reduce the extent of 
trade between African countries. Trade policies that are aimed to promote trade within 
the region (i.e., FTA, custom unions) are likely to fail because SSA countries produce 
similar homogeneous products. The key factor for economic success from international 
trade for the SSA region relies on how to manufacture products in different varieties 
and how to export their comparative advantage goods outside the region. 
The last chapter identifies the effects of property rights on the total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) across different property rights levels and income groups in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA). I subdivide SSA countries by their property rights score and by their 
income levels. Then, I estimate a model in which TFP depends on human capital and 
institutional qualities. The results mainly show that private property rights have a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the TFP in SSA. This result indicates 
that private property rights are important determinants in the process of economic 
development. If well-defined and enforced by state laws, private property rights will 
contribute to growth in SSA. 
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Chapter 1 
Exchange Rate Regimes and 
Inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa 
1.1 Introduction 
1 
The impact of exchange rate regime (ERR) on economic performance is one of the 
hotly debated issues in the field of international finance. This correlation gained more 
importance in the face of financial crises as international capital flows become increas-
ingly unstable. The critical role of ERR in economic performance in our globalizing 
world has induced many countries in recent years to switch from one regime to an-
other. If, following the demise of the Bretton Woods system, the choice of an ERR was 
important for stabilization outcomes, then, nowadays the choice of ERR may have im-
portant policy implications - particularly, for policy aimed at tackling external shocks 
and speculative attacks (Eichengreen, 2008). 
Across the globe, different types of ERR ranging from hard peg to free floating 
regimes exist. There is no consensus on which type of regime better enhances eco-
nomic performance. Alternative ERR have some strengths and weaknesses regarding 
economic outcomes in the country when they are at work. There are some arguments in 
favor of and against each type of the ERR. For instance, Mundell (1963) and Fleming 
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(1962) argue that under a fixed ERR, trade and investment are more certain. The trade 
and investment advantages of the fixed ERR stem from the reduction of transaction 
costs and lower inflation expectations. These advantages are what led the European 
Economic Community (EEC) to adopt the fixed ERR to achieve their single market 
program. The lower inflation associated with the fixed ERR has been an important 
incentive that enticed Great Britain to return to the gold standard in 1925 after aban-
doning it in the wake of world war I in 1914 (Capie, Mills and Wood, 1986a). By fixing 
a currency to a foreign anchor, the domestic country imports the monetary policy of 
the anchor country. Such import is associated with political commitment and disci-
plinary monetary policy (i.e., alignment to the anchor country's monetary policies) for 
anti-inflationary outcomes. However, the fixed ERR is criticized for poorly insulating 
the economy against external shocks (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). 
Supporters of the flexible ERR argue that it confers more independence of 
monetary policy through the flexibility of the nominal exchange rate. By changing the 
nominal exchange rate, the country gains control over the impact of disruptive economic 
shocks. Friedman (1953) pointed out that the speed at which a country adjusts relative 
prices when hit by a real shock depends on the ERR at work in that country. 
Friedman (1953) argues that in a world of sticky prices, the flexible ERR ab-
sorbs the effects of external shocks more effectively than the fixed ERR. Indeed, under 
a flexible regime, in the presence. of shocks, the nominal exchange rate adjusts innnedi-
ately, allowing relative prices to change. This mechanism reduces the effects of shocks 
on macro variables, especially on output. Previous empirical work has found support 
for Friedman's hypothesis. For example, Broda (2004) tests Friedman's hypothesis on 
the terms of trade shocks and finds that the response of real GDP to a terms of trade 
shock is much smaller under a flexible regime than under a fixed regime. Broda notes 
that in response to a 10 percent negative shock to the terms of trade, the real exchange 
rate depreciated faster under the floating system while the depreciation was slower in 
the pegged regime. As a result, real GDP fell by 1.9 percent under fixed regime and 
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only by 0.2 percent in the flexible exchange rate regime. 
The advantage of the floating ERR is that it insulates the economy from exter-
nal shocks and eventual speculative attacks. However, floating regimes are expected to 
exhibit high volatility in exchange rates and high inflation. Mussa (1986) underlined 
that real exchange rates fluctuate a lot more in the short run in countries with flexible 
ERR than in countries with fixed ERR. This is so because nominal exchange rates are 
very volatile under flexible regimes. Similarly, Shambaugh (2004), Klein (2005), and 
Klein and Shambaugh (2008) show that exchange rates are more volatile under a float-
ing ERR than under a fixed ERR. Specifically, Klein and Shambaugh (2008) find that 
in magnitude, pegged (fixed) ERR have about 16 percent less volatility in the nominal 
exchange rate than a floating ERR. After classifying counties by the de facto behavior 
of the country's monetary authorities, Levy et al. (2001) show that a flexible ERR 
exhibits higher exchange rate volatility with lower volatility in international reserves 
while the opposite holds under a pegged ERR. 
Whether in the aftermath one type of ERR outperforms the others in terms 
of the economic outcome, ERRs are crucial determinants of economic performance. 
Rose (2011) states that "the exchange rate is an important asset price, perhaps the 
most import asset price". This implies that the regime monitoring the exchange rates 
is important to assets' prices and therefore economic outcomes. An ERR can impact 
the economy through different macroeconomic channels. For instance, the flexible ERR 
can expose the econoniy through the inflationary channel; the fixed regime by retarding 
the adjustment of prices in the face of external shocks allows large fluctuations in 
output. Inflation expectations can lead to higher or lower interest rates in the country 
and thereby affect trade and investment incentives. In short, an ERR is a crucial 
determinant of economic outcomes. 
Despite the prominent connection between ERR and economic performance, 
little work exist in the empirical literature that addresses how the type of ERR im-
plemented is retarding the economic take-off of some developing countries. This paper 
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attempts to fill this gap for some Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries which are still 
lagging economically. Specifically, this paper focuses on the inflation dynamics between 
two groups of countries with different types of ERR in SSA: the CFA franc currency 
unions with a pegged ERR and the Non-CFA SSA countries with a non-fixed 1 ERR. 
Two important facts explain the choice of the country sample. First, the countries of 
the CFA currency unions2 have been using a common currency - the CFA franc with a 
conventional peg even before their independence from the French and up to date. The 
CFA franc had been pegged to the French Franc since December 26th 1945 - the date 
of its creation and it has been pegged to the Euro since January 1999. From this fact, 
it is hard to identify how these countries would have performed economically under an 
alternative ERR. 
The main feature of the CFA franc.currency is the guarantee of its parity and 
convertibility by the treasury since the creation of this currency. This convertibility is 
achieved and maintained by the central banks with the French Treasury through the 
mechanism of an operations account. The convertibility of the CFA franc by the French 
Treasury has some political and economic incentives. Politically, this allows the French 
authorities to remain implicated and influence the monetary decisions of their former 
colonies. The CFA franc remains the emblem of colonization and a powerful channel of 
France's imperialism over its "former" colonies. Under the economics point of view, the 
convertibility of the CFA franc benefits most to France. The guarantee of the convert-
ibility based on colonial financial arrangements advantages French multinational firms 
who invest in Africa and transfer the funds to France by reducing transaction costs. 
Most importantly, since the monetary decisions are made upon France's agreement, 
1 Different types of ERR exist within the non-CFA sample, ranging from a managed ERR to a 
floating ERR. 
2 The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) - The countries of WAEMU are: 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'lvoire, Guinea-Bissau Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. But Guinea-Bissau 
is not included in the analysis as it joined the union only in 1998, and the Central African Monetary 
and Economic Community (CAMEC) - The countries of CAMEC are: Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. 
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these decisions are made in favor of the French companies (see IMF 1969). 
Since its creation, the CFA franc has been devaluated only once. A 50 percent 
devaluation of the CFA franc in foreign currency occurred on January 13, 1994. The 
1994 devaluation explains the high inflation peak of the CFA zones in the Appendix 
Figure 1. Between 1990 and 1993, the CFA franc turned out to be overvalued. During 
this period, the member countries faced severe fiscal imbalances accompanied by rapid 
growth of the external debt. Moreover, the CFA franc countries have been also subject 
to adverse terms of trade movements. The devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 was 
intended to alleviate the macroeconomic issues. Though, this peak does not influence 
the empirical results. 
Secondly, SSA countries exhibit many commonalities in terms of their history 
and economic characteristics (market access issues, dependence on the export of few 
primary commodities, financial markets development, geography, level of industrializa-
tion, government efficiency, etc.). Therefore, it is appropriate to compare the economic 
performances of the CFA countries to that of the non-CFA SSA countries with alter-
native ERR. Discussing the correlation between. economic outcomes and ERR for the 
CFA countries and distinguishing between the CFA and non-CFA countries of SSA can 
provide important policy prescriptions - for both exchange rate regime and monetary 
policy reforms - to aid in solving the countries' growth delay. This paper focuses on 
inflation dynamics across the two samples because a key purpose of participating in a 
currency union is to benefit from lower inflation. 
The goal carried out in this paper is so far an uncovered topic, especially 
distinguishing between the CFA and Non-CFA countries of SSA countries on inflation 
dynamics. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 states the 
stylized facts about the fixed and flexible ERR. Section 3 describes exchange rate 
regimes in general and provides the classification of SSA countries by exchange rate 
regime and by monetary policy framework. Section 4 describes the data, presents the 
models, and states the hypothesis. The results and their interpretations are in section 
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5. Section 6 concludes the paper. Regression tables and figures are stored in separate 
sections. 
1.2 The Stylized Facts about Fixed and Flexible 
Exchange Rate Regimes 
Across the literature there are three key stylized facts about the ERR. The first 
is the inconsistency between the de facto and the de jure ERR (i.e., countries that 
officially claim to float heavily intervene in the exchange market to regulate the rate 
of exchange of their currencies). The second is that many countries have shifted to a 
flexible ERR since the demise of the Bretton Wood System. The third fact is what 
Eichengreen (1994) named the "hollowing-out hypothesis" and Fischer (2001) refers to 
as a "bipolar view". The "hollowing-out hypothesis" or the "bipolar view" stipulates 
that intermediate regimes including conventional pegs are incompatible with capital 
flows. Only the two extremes: hard peg or free floating are sustainable in the face 
of high capital flows. Some recent facts across the world support the vulnerability of 
the pegs in the face of capital mobility. More or less, countries involved in crises in 
the 1990s were associated with the fixed (pegged) ERR. The 1994 Tequila crisis of 
Mexico, the 1998 exchange rate crises of Russia and Brazil, and those of Turkey and 
Argentina in 2000, are a few examples. Fischer (2001) mentions that in contrast to the 
emerging countries with pegged currencies who experienced the exchange rate crisis, 
other emerging countries with more flexible rates (South Africa, Israel) avoided crises 
of this type. The implication of this third fact is that fixed ERR's are less efficient in 
insulating economies from external shocks. 
With a fixed ERR the country sacrifices its ability to stabilize the economy 
against attacks in return for credibility gains through commitments (Klein and Sham-
baugh, 2010). Under a fixed ERR, the slow responsiveness of the nominal exchange 
rate to adjust relative prices in the face of external shocks allows disturbances in real 
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GDP (e.g., Friedman, 1953; Levy eta!., 2001; Caballero, 2002; Broda, 2004, Edwards 
and Yeyati, 2005). Therefore, fixed regimes would exhibit more loss in their per capita 
outputs while the reverse is expected for floating regimes. Nevertheless, for the fixed 
ERR, the loss in output is expected to be compensated by lower inflation through cred-
ibility and disciplinary monetary policies associated to the commitment of pegging the 
domestic currency to a foreign currency that plays the role of an anchor. 
Nate that pegging a currency is associated with various political commitments 
which allow importing the anchor country's monetary policies (disciplinary monetary 
policy), reduce inflationary policies, increase the credibility of the domestic monetary 
authorities, reduce inflation expectations and stabilize the economy. The high political 
cost of fixing the exchange rate is what forces policy makers to adopt certain monetary 
and fiscal policies to avoid the demise of the regime. This constraint confers credibility 
and discipline to the fixed ERR (e.g., Meltzer, 1986; Ghosh eta!. 1997; Yagci, 2001; 
Levy et al., 2001). On the other hand, under a flexible ERR the management of the 
nominal exchange rate to facilitate the quick adjustment of relative prices is associated 
with higher inflation expectations. In fact, the flexibility of the nominal exchange rate 
makes the relative price less predictable. 
The correlation between inflation and the exchange rate regime is well described 
in the literature. The investigation of inflation persistence shows three main findings: 
1) inflation rates vary over time and across countries due to the monetary policy frame-
work; 2) the speed of this variation differs over time; 3) there is an inflation-output 
trade off associated with inflation adjustment (see Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; Sargent, 
2001; Cecchetti and Debelle, 2006). Although not all papers directly relate inflation to 
the ERR, three main models are used in the literature to study inflation: the flexible 
and sticky price models and the sticky information model. The flexible price model 
argues that inflation evolves over time due to the monetary authorities' action of ad-
justing monetary policy very frequently. The expansionary policy of the policymakers 
leads to inflationary outcomes (Barra and Gordon, 1983). The pioneers of the sticky 
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price model use the wage contract in explaining inflation (Taylor, 1979; Calvo, 1983). 
However, the sticky price model falls short in explaining inflation after introducing the 
real wage (Fuhrer and Moore, 1995). Lastly, the sticky information model developed 
by Mankiw and Reis (2002) shows that, rather than sticky wages, prices adjust slowly 
because the cost of information prevents economic agents from frequently updating 
prices according to current macroeconomic conditions. The flexible price model has 
some incarnation of the ERR. In fact, the frequent price adjustment of the monetary 
authorities reflects the flexibility of the nominal exchange which is the foundation for 
the flexible exchange rate. Conclusively, a flexible exchange rate is associated with 
higher inflation. 
Recently, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) described inflation dynamic in the contest 
of exchange rate regimes. The theoretical framework developed by the authors focused 
on the cost and benefits of the fixed exchange rate regime. According to Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (1995), there are three main reason why countries fix (peg) their currency's 
foreign value. The first reason is to avoid exchange rate volatility like the one under the 
floating ERR. Exchange rate volatility creates uncertainty about future assets' prices 
and reduces trade and investment (see also Mundell, 1963; Fleming, 1962). The second 
reason is to import the anchor country's inflation rate. Fixing the domestic currency 
to a foreign one with lower inflation allows the domestic country to experience lower 
inflation due to the credibility by committing to disciplinary policies. The third reason, 
closely related to the second is the disinflationary objective. Some countries adopt the 
fixed ERR after they have experienced higher degrees of inflation. Fixing (pegging) 
the currency in this case becomes an objective solution to reducing inflation. Among 
all, the main purpose and the theoretical benefit of fixing a currency's foreign value is 
to have price volatility under control. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) also point on one inconvenience of fixing the ex-
change rate: the forgone control over domestic money supply that would have been 
used for stabilization purposes. Theoretically and practically, in the face of external 
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shocks such as the drop in demand for exports goods, the country would adjust import 
and export prices by depreciating the real exchange rate. That is the monetary au-
thorities can reduce the domestic interest rate. The reduction of the home interest rate 
puts demand pressure on foreign assets with a relatively higher interest rate. Therefore, 
the domestic currency depreciates and stimulates the short run demand for domestic 
goods. If quick, this adjustment reduces the impacts of the shock. But, if prices and 
nominal exchaJJge rates are rigid in the short run like under the fixed exchange rate 
regime, firms will have to hire less or fire some workers to reduce output in the face 
of the lower demand for their products. In this situation, as the domestic interest rate 
.is determined by the foreign rate, the domestic monetary authorities have no power 
to change it. Thus, domestic attempts to change the money supply have no effects. 
Indeed, under the fixed exchange rate, the money supply is out of the control of the 
monetary authorities. 
Given these stylized facts aJJd the theoretical frameworks about flexible and 
fixed exchange rate regimes, this paper tests whether the CFA franc currency union 
countries- whose common currency is pegged to a foreign anchor experience lower in-
flation rates in the short and long run compared to the others, the non-CFA countries 
of SSA as their benefit for scarifying output in the face of shocks. 
1.3 Exchange Rate Regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The official classification of countries by their exchange rate regime (ERR) has 
been traditionally provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). But Calvo and 
Reinhart (2000) show how some countries that officially claim to have a floating regime 
intervene in the foreign exchange market. The mismatch between the de jure and the de 
facto classifications of countries has led economists in the field of international finance 
to make a clear distinction and reclassify countries based on their de facto regimes. 
The most known alternative classifications of countries based on the de facto approach 
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are those of Levy et al. (2000a, 2003), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Shambaugh (2004), 
and Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). Each of them uses different methodologies.3 
However, the classifications of SSA countries from any of the above cited classification 
sources match those of the IMF. For this reason, the recent IMF's de facto classification 
of countries provided in the AREAER4 is used in this paper. 
The IMF's annual report on exchange rate arrangement and monetary policy 
frameworks classifies exchange rate arrangements based on the degree to which the 
exchange rate is determined by the market. Ten key types of ERR are listed from across 
the world. (1) No separate legal tender (hard pegs), (2) currency board regimes (hard 
peg), (3) conventional peg 5 (soft peg). (4) Crawling pegs, (5) crawl-like arrangements, 
(6) pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands6 ; (7) Stabilized arrangements, (8) 
other managed arrangement7 regimes, (9) floating and (10) free floating8 exchange rate 
regimes employ monetary aggregate target and inflation targeting as their monetary 
policy frameworks. 
All of the above types of ERR associated with different monetary policy frame-
works are at work in different countries in SSA. WAEMU and CEMAC that make up 
the two CFA franc zones, use the conventional peg as their exchange rate regime. The 
3The techniques of Levy et al.,(2003) are based on the exchange rate and international reserves. 
Shambaugh employs the band of exchange rate fluctuation. The author classifies an ERR as peg if the 
exchange rate fluctuates within a narrow band over a long period and non-peg otherwise. Reinhart 
and co-authors use the variations in the market rates of exchange. 
4 Annual Report-on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
5The peg regimes use an exchange rate anchor as the monetary policy framework. Under the 
exchange rate anchor, the monetary authority buys or sells foreign exchange to maintain domestic 
currency's rate of exchange at the targeted rate or within a range. The exchange rate represents the 
nominal anchor or intermediate target to monetary policy for these regimes (see IMF's AREAER, 
2010. 
6 Pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands also use the exchange rage anchor framework. 
7Managed arrangement regimes use exchange rate anchor, monetary aggregate target and inflation 
targeting as monetary policy frameworks. Under the monetary aggregate framework the targeted 
aggregate serves as the anchor to monetary policy. For inflation targeting framework, monetary policy 
decision depends on inflation forecasting and how the forecasted inflation deviates from the targeted 
one. Thus inflation forecast is the nominal anchor to monetary policy. 
8Floating and free floating regimes employ monetary aggregate target and inflation targeting as 
their monetary policy frameworks. 
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CFA franc of CEMAC and that of WAEMU have the same rate of exchange to the euro 
to which they are pegged. The monetary policy framework at work in the CFA zones 
is the exchange rate anchor. Eritrea, Cape Verde, Comoros, Sao Tome and Principles, 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland also use the conventional peg as their exchange rate 
regime. The difference between the CFA franc zones and these countries is that the 
zones form a currency union (the CFA franc zone countries are linked to one central 
bank in each zone and use a common currency: the CFA franc) while the other coun-
tries have their own central banks. Zimbabwe uses the no-separate-legal-tender regime 
and is pegged to the U.S. dollar. 
Burundi and Rwanda use a stabilized arrangement ERR with a monetary aggre-
gate target as their monetary policy framework. Botswana has the crawling peg regime 
with the currency compositely pegged. Ethiopia is pegged to the U.S. dollar under the 
crawl-like-arrangement exchange rate regime. Angola, Liberia, Guinea, Malawi, and 
Nigeria exhibit other managed arrangement regimes. Angola and Liberia are pegged to 
the U.S. dollar with an exchange rate anchor while Guinea, Malawi, and Nigeria use a 
monetary aggregate target framework. Twelve SSA countries operate under the float-
ing exchange rate regime. Ten9 of these target a monetary aggregate while the other 
two - Ghana and South Africa, have inflation targeting as their monetary policy frame-
work. Mauritius is the only SSA country where a free floating exchange rate regime is 
at work. In this paper the SSA countries will be grouped as CFA and non-CFA zones, 
where the non-CFA zone combines pegged, floating and some intermediate ERR's. 
9 Congo, Dem. Rep., Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tanza-
nia, Uganda, and Zambia. 
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1.4 The Model and Data Description 
1.4.1 Data Description 
The data on all variables used in this investigation are retrieved from the World 
Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) database. The variables employed in-
clude: Consumer price index inflation: (CPI), money supply (M2), real GDP, popula-
tion, the terms of trade (computed as the ratio of exports to imports prices), and the 
trade openness (calculated as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP). The 
data covers a panel of 36 SSA countries over the period from 1980 to 2007. Countries 
included in the examination are those with valid data on all variables of interest over 
the entire period. Countries with hyperinflation (inflation rate exceeding 50 percent 
and persistent over many years during the examination period) are excluded. Countries 
like Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Angola are not included for 
both reasons, the hyperinflation issue and the lack of data. Guinea Bissau, a current 
member of WAEMU is excluded from the analysis because it joined the union in 1998. 
So, this country has been a member for less than 20 years according to the data period. 
Benin and many other countries were not included for lack of data on key variables 
over many years. 
1.4.2 The Models 
Studies of inflation have frequently used augmented Phillips curve models in which 
the policy preferences of the natural rate of unemployment and the expected supply of 
expansionary policy are incorporated. Although these models well suit inflation per-
sistence, there is no reliable record on employment for many SSA countries; making 
it difficult to use such models to empirically test inflation in SSA. Other models have 
been used to examine the inflation effects of exchange rate regimes in many developing 
countries. For instance, Levy and Sturzenegger (2001) developed an inflation model in 
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which inflation is related to the changes in money supply growth, the change in GDP 
growth, the real interest rate and the change in money velocity. However, their model 
appears as an identity10 and thus, it gives less opportunity to conduct the comparative 
analysis on inflation across the SSA countries. Kamin (1997) studies the linkage be-
tween inflation and the ERR for Asian, industrialized and Latin American countries. 
But the model does not distingush between the short and the long run. I explain 
Kamin's model in Appendix III. 
To capture the short and the long run inflation differences between my sub-
samples while avoiding estimating an identity model, I construct a model where inflation 
depends on trade openness,11 external shocks (terms-of-trade) and the lagged inflation. 
In this model, I add the dummies for exchange rate regime groups in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) (Equation 1). The terms-of-trade shocks and the trade openness are 
important to be controlled for in the model, because they are potential inflationary 
channels. The reason for the inclusion of the lagged inflation is that there can be 
some serial correlation between current and past inflation (the inertia problem). The 
augmentation with the CFA dummy allows identification of whether the fixed ERR 
succeeds in maintaining lower inflation against the flexible regime in the short and the 
long runs as a result of enhanced credibility and disciplined monetary policies. 
(1.1) 
where, Kit is inflation rate in country i at time t. CF A;, Open,,, TT;, and 1f;t-l 
represent respectively the dummy for the CFA zone, trade openness, terms of trade, 
and lagged inflation. The CFA dummy takes the value of 1 if country i belongs to the 
CFA franc currency union or zero otherwise. 
For the short run, I estimate equation (1) on the full sample (sample S1 comprising 
10
1rit ~ f!o + f!,Ll.(M2it)- fJ2Ll.(RGDPit) + {!3!,, + fi•Ll.(vit) 
11Trade openness is denoted "open" and calculated as the ratio of the sum of imports and exports 
to GDP. 
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CFA and all non-CFA countries), the first reduced sample (the 82- sample without 
pegging non-CFA countries), the second reduced sample (the 83- sample with only the 
CFA and floating ERR non-CFA countries), and the third reduced sample (the 84-
sample with only the CFA and pegged ERR non-CFA countries) using pooled OL8 
and fixed effects estimation. For the long run inflation regression, the average inflation 
(1r,) over the data period is estimated based on the CFA dummy (Equation 2). By 
the theory, if the CFA countries have lower inflation relative to the other countries, it 
would be a result of a lower money growth. To examine the extent of money supply 
growth in the CFA zones relative to other 8SA countries, I estimate equation (3) below. 
equation {3) is similar to equation (2). However,. the average growth ofmoney supply 
(grawthM2,) is used as the dependent variable in Equation, 3. 
"' = {30 + f3,CF A;+ c, (1.2) 
GrowthM2,- {30 + f31CFA, + c,. (1.3) 
1.4.3 The Testable Hypothesis 
From the theory, the testable hypothesis is that, if a fixed exchange rate regime 
provides lower inflation, the CFA franc must have lower inflation in both the short 
and the long run compared to the non-fixed exchange rate regime countries. Thus in 
equation (1), one would expect {34 to be negative and statistically significant, and in 
equation (2), {31 to be negative and statistically significant. The negative signs of these 
coefficients would imply that the CFA franc countries exhibit lower inflation relative 
to the non-CFA countries. Theoretically, there is no incentive to increase the money 
supply in an attempt to lower the nominal interest rate under a fixed exchange rate 
regime. Under a fixed ERR, inflation can be reduced by maintaining lower money 
supply growth. From this point of view, we would expect {31 in equation (3) to be 
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negative and statistically significant. In addition, if the main source of lowering inflation 
is the extent of money suppy growth, then the magnitude of /31 in equation (3) would 
match the size of /31 in equation (2). However, if there is any mismatch between /31 
of equation (2) and that of equation (3), then other sources might be influencing the 
inflation rates. These sources could be the extent of the growth of the real GDP per 
capita and/ or the growth of money velocity. 
The see how the growth of the real GDP per capita and money velocity influence 
inflation in the CFA zones, I estimate equation 3.1 and 3.2 below. 
RGDPjcap; = {30 + {31CFA; + E; (1.4) 
(1.5) 
where, RGDP/cap; and 1.1; are respectively, the average of the growth of real GDP 
per capita and that of the growth of money velocity over the data period. C FA; 
is the CFA dummy. Theoretically, we would expect a negative correlation between 
inflation and money velocity growth. Also, a higher growth of output would contribute 
in lowering inflation. If there is a mismacth between the sizes of /31 in equation 2 and 
3, then the coefficient restriction on /31 in equation 3.1 and 3.2 will depend on the type 
of the mismatch. 
Case 1: If the size of /31 in equation (3) is larger than that of /31 in equation 
(2) in absolute value, this would imply that the extent of the RGDP per capita is 
rather resisting to the reduction of inflation. This resistance will be reflected in a 
negative coefficient of /31 in equation (3.1). Nevertheless, a negative /31 in equation 
(3.1) would meant the CFA countries face a loss in their output per capita. Which 
loss could be detrimental to welfare. In addition, if the sum of /31 in equation (3) and 
/31 in equation (3.1) still mismatches the size of /31 in equation (2), then the growth 
of the money velocity should have some influences on the inflation rates. In the case 
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where the sum of /31 in equation (3) and in equation (3.1) is larger in absolute value 
than the magnitude of {31 in equation (2), there must be a positive growth of money 
velocity in the CFA zones relative to that in other non-CFA countries. The underlying 
implication of a positive growth of the money supply velocity is a higher real interest 
rate. In fact, higher real interst rate induces banks and consumers to avoid keeping 
money. Thus, higher interest rates reduce money demand and allow faster circulation 
of money - higher growth of money velocity. 
Money velocity growth is theoretically influenced by the nominal interest rate. 
If the CFA countries exhibit higher growth of money velocity, this would imply that 
these countries face .higher nominal interest rate. However, the difference between the 
nominal interest rate and the real interest rate is the rate of inflation (real interest rate 
=nominal interest rate- inflation). So, if these countries face higher growth of money 
velocity, implying higher nominal interest rate, they should be enduring also higher 
real interest rates. This is so because, as inflation rates are lower in these zones, there 
should not be a large difference between the nominal and the real interest rates. In 
either case, higher interest rates (implying higher growth of money velocity) and/ or 
output loss would decay the economic performance of the CFA countries. The reason 
is, real interest rates are the cost of borrowing. So, facing higher interest rates can 
reduce investment per capita and output. Moreover, the welfare of individuals depends 
on how much goods and services they can consume. Hence, output loss directly reduces 
people's welfare. 
Case 2: If the size of /31 in equation (3) is smaller than that of /31 in equation (2) 
in absolute value, we would expect the reverse senario from case 1. Note also that for 
the comparisons between the CFA and the pegged non-CFA (samples 84), if the CFA 
countries perform better, this would be the currency union effect as both parties in the 
sample have the pegged ERR. the only difference is the the CFA zones are currency 
unions while each country of the pegged non-CFA group has its own central bank. 
I estimate equations 2, 3, 3.1, and 3.2 by OLS and the robust regression for 
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S1, S2, S3, and S4. The robust regression methodology allows controlling for the 
heteroscedasticity to avoid biased parameter estimates. I report the results of the long 
run estimations (equations, 2, 3, 3.1, and 3.2) All tables are stored in the Table section. 
1.5 Results and Interpretation 
The focus on Sub- Saharan Africa (SSA) and the distinction between CFA and non-
CPA countries in this examination reveals important information on the exchange rate 
regimes (ERR)' influences on economic performances across SSA countries. Tables 1, 
2, 3, and 4 provide respectively the long run inflation, money growth, output per capita 
growth, and money velocity growth in the CFA countries relatively to: 1) all other non-
CPA countries, 2) non-CFA-non-pegged ERR countries, 3) the non-CFA with floating 
regimes, and the non-CFA pegging ERR countries. The OLS estimation of the long run 
inflation shows that the CFA countries have respectively 11 percent, 13 percent, 16, 
and 3 percent less inflation relative to all other non-CFA, the non-CFA-non pegged, the 
non-CPA-floating countries, and the non-CFA pegged ERR countries (all the results 
are statistically significant at a 99 percent level of confidence). 
The seemingly higher inflation of the non-CFA before the robust regression is 
due to a few countries in this sub-sample. Actually, at different occasions over the 
data period, there have been temporary hyperinflations in some non-CFA countries. 
However, after the peaks, the countries quickly recovered and inflation rate become as 
usual. For instance, in the early 1990s, Zambia experienced an occasional hyperinflation 
mounting up to 183 percent. But after this period, the inflation rate declined back to its 
common rate around 25 percent. Similarly, Uganda experienced some brief, but severe 
hyperinflation in the late 1980s; Ghana was subject to an inflation of 122 percent in 
1983. In 1995, the inflation in Nigeria reached 72 percent; Uganda had its highest 
inflation (56 percent) in 1986 and Mozambique's inflation peak of 63 percent occurred 
in 1994. None of these countries has a peg regime. Rather, they are all floating regime 
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countries; that is why there is no big difference between the long run results of the 
sample 82 (using non-CFA without the pegs) and that of the sample 83 (using the 
non-CFA floating regimes only). 
The occasional inflation peaks highlighted above do not reflect the usual av-
erage inflation rate of these non-CFA floating regime countries. The peaks create the 
heteroscedasticity (outliers) problem in the data. The presence of heteroscedasticity 
seems to be pumping up inflation rates of the non-CFA countries as a whole and mak-
ing as if the CFA countries have relatively very low inflation rates in the long run. The 
classical estimation methods such as the ordinary least square (018) are outlier sen-
sitive. Therefore, the presence of outliers causes the 018 estimation to be inefficient; 
leading to inflated and bias estimates of the residuals (Mia et al., 2008). To correct 
for this mitigation, I use the robust regression methodology. The robust regression 
is the estimation methodology that aims to control for heteroscedasticity in the data 
to avoid biased parameter estimates. There is an extensive literature on how outliers 
occur and how to limit their effects on the parameter estimates. Across literature, the 
most used method to correct for heteroscedasticity in the data is the robust estimation 
methodology (see Fellner, 1986). 
After accounting for heteroscadasticity in the model, the inflation rates of the 
CFA countries turn out to be in average 5 percent less than that of other country 
samples, and 0.4 percent less than that of ·other pegged regimes non-CFA countries. 
Even though not too large, the CFA countries exhibit lower inflation relative to their 
88A counterparty as a result of having a fixed ERR. Moreover, being in a currency 
union pays off in terms of containing inflation as the CFA countries have slightly lower 
inflation compared to the other pegged non-CFA countries. Basically, there is a lower 
inflation benefit for the CFA countries from having a fixed ERR and being a currency 
union. 
This lower inflation is obtained in the CFA zones by maintaining lower money 
growth. As shown in the results of the robust regression for money growth, the CFA 
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countries have respectively 8 percent, 9 percent, 11 percent, and -7 percent less growth 
in their money supply relative to all other non-CPA, the non-CPA-non-pegged, the non-
CPA-floating, and the pegged non-CPA countries. The CPA countries have a restraint 
growth of money. However, the comparison of the extent of the growth of money in the 
CPA countries to their lower inflation level reveals a mismatch. The CPA countries do 
not have as much lower inflation as they would in accordance to their restraint money 
growth. Across each sub-sample, the magnitude of the negative money growth is larger 
than that of inflation (-7.6 percent versus -4.7 percent in S1; -9.5 percent versus -5 
percent in S2; -11 percent versus -7 percent in S3; and -7 percent versus -0.4 percent 
in S4). 
This mismatch is due to two phenomena within the CPA zones. The first 
fact is the apparent negative effects of the fixed ERR on output per capita growth 
and the second is the higher growth of money velocity within the CPA zones. As 
underlined in the hypothesis section, a higher growth of output would contribute to 
lowering inflation. However, the CPA countries exhibit negative output per capita 
growth relative to the non-CPA states. The negative coefficient of the RGDP per 
capita growth across the three sub-samples indicates that fixed ERR hurts the CPA 
countries by reducing their extent of output growth. In addition, the CPA zones having 
less output growth compared to the pegged non-CPA implies that the CPA countries 
are disadvantaged by being locked in a currency union. Consequently, the negative 
effect of output growth diminishes the effects of money growth on inflation. Across 
the three first sub-samples, about 1 percent of the lower money growth compensates 
for output loss. In the last sub-sample (S4), 2 percent of the lower money growth is 
employed to compensate for the output loss. 
On the other hand, the CPA countries have a higher growth of money velocity 
relative to the non-CPA states. The result of S4 shows that the CPA countries have a 
lower money velocity growth compared to the pegged non-CPA. However, the difference 
is not statistically significant. This positive velocity growth constitutes another con-
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tracting factor to the effects of money growth in reducing inflation. The CFA countries 
have respectively 1.6 percent, 2 percent, and 1 percent higher growth of money velocity 
relative to all the non-CFA, the non-CFA-non-pegged, and the non-CFA-floating coun-
tries. So, the impact of the restrained money growth on inflation in the CFA countries 
is reduced respectively by these amounts of money velocity growths across the sub-
samples. The higher growth of the money velocity in the CFA zones might mainly 
stem from the higher interest rates in these countries. After subtracting the sizes of 
the coefficients of output per capita growth and the money velocity growth from the 
coefficient of money growth, the difference is about the magnitude of the lower infla-
tion in the CFA countries (for 81, 82, and 83), but the mismatch persists in 84. the 
difference in money growth between the CFA zones and the pegged non-CFA is large 
(7 percent at a 99 percent level of coniiderice), but the difference in terms of inflation 
between the two groups is relatively small (0.4 percent). 
The sub-sample 84 reveals that the pegged non-CFA countries have the ability 
to achieve lower inflation (closely as much as in the CFA countries), maitain similar 
rates of money velocity growth, and have a higher growth of their output per capita 
relative to the CFA countries. As the size of the output loss in the CFA surpasse their 
extent of lower inflation relative to the other pegged non-CFA, being a member of the 
CFA currency union must be economically disruptive. Gurtner (1999) warns that the 
CFA zones do not meet the required conditions for an optimum curency area (OCA). 
According to Gurtner (1999), the CFA countries follow different supply cycles. Thus, 
they face growth barriers at different points of time. The paths of the GDPs of the 
CFA countries depends on the fluctuation of the prices of the primary commodities 
that underline the economies of these countries. Moreover, there is no intensive trade 
within the zones to necessitate the reduction of transaction cost by using a common 
currency. In addition labor mobility across countries within the zones is not intense 
(only the labor mobility in the informal sector sems to be fulfilled according to Gurtner, 
1999). As the CFA union countries do not meet the requirements of the OCA, it is 
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not surprising that locking countries with such heterogenuous cyclical patterns under 
a common currency is undermining their economic performances. The reason of the 
pronounced difference between the CFA and the other pegged non-CFA in economic 
performance is the difference in interest rates between the two groups. As shown in 
Figure 4 of Appendix II, the pegged non-CFA have more investment per capita relative 
to the CFA zones. This higher investment per capita could be a result of a lower cost 
of borrowing (lower interest rates). 
In general, the difference in inflation between the CFA and non-CFA countries 
is decreasing while the gap in investment per capita between them is enlarging (see 
Figure 1 of Appendix II versus Figure 4 of Appendix II). The inflation gap between the 
CFA and the non-CFA is decreasing over time. The inflation rates of the CFA countries 
are increasing while that of the non-CFA is diminishing on average. This convergence 
is due to the fact that output is growing faster in the non-CFA zone and slower in the 
CFA zones. 
The inflation-growth trade-off is a major question in the discussion of the eco-
nomic performance of developing countries like the CFA states. Is it worth sacrificing 
output for "lower" inflation? The lower extent of output in the CFA zones is a result 
of different macroeconomic problem which slow economic activities. In fact, having 
higher nominal interest rates, the CFA countries experience higher real interest rate 
which is the cost of borrowing. As shown in Figure 2, the real interest rate has been 
high and more volatile in the CFA countries than that in the non-CFA states. As real 
interest rate reflects the cost of capital in the production process, facing high real inter-
est rate can limit investments, the extents of output and the economic growth. Figure 
4 supports the lower rate of investment under the CFA zones as a result of higher real 
interest rates. 
The evidence from the hypothetical money model states three main benefits 
from keeping lower inflation. The first is the transaction cost reduction. The second is 
the reduction of the capital income tax and the third is the reduction of uncertainty. 
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However, Aiyagari (1990) studies the benefits and the costs of maintaining lower in-
flation. The paper mainly shows that the costs of such policy outweighs it benefits. 
For instance, the reduction of transaction could be achieved by creating more forms 
of money useable in transaction to earn market rates of interest. Moreover, Aiyagari 
(1990) argues that reducing money supply in an attempt of keeping lower levels of 
inflation might not systematically reduce the variability of inflation. Thus, the impact 
of a lowering-inflation policy on welfare could be marginal (Aiyagari, 1990). Therefore, 
instead of an inflation lowering policy, which is associated with higher costs, one could 
simply implement alternative policies, save in costs and reach the same benefits. In 
addition, a study like Hercowitz (1982) show that supply shocks have stronger effects 
on relative prices than the changes in money supply (inflation), at least for the US 
data. 
Since wage contracts are usually not fully indexed to price level variability, 
as the real value of money increase due to inflation reduction, the money amount of 
the contract is less likely to fully change and compensate for the change in the price 
levels. Thus inflation reduction is associated to welfare loss (Okun, 1978; Fischer, 1984). 
Fischer (1984) estimates the sacrifice ratio12 at 6 percent. Okun (1978) and Fischer 
(1984) argue that what matters in inlproving welfare is the variability of personal 
consumption of goods and services (Aiyagari, 1990). Thus the CFA countries incur 
welfare loss through their alignment to a fixed ERR as they experience output loss. 
The CFA countries exhibit in average 3 percent less inflation relative to their 
counterparties in the short run (these results are significant at 99 percent confidence, 
see the pooled panel OLS estimation). The CFA dummy is omitted from the fixed effect 
estimation as it is tinle invariant. Basically, like in the long run, the CFA countries 
face the inflation-growth trade-off also in the short run. This implies that in the short 
run, the member countries of the CFA franc currency unions experience welfare loss 
through this trade-off. 
12The sacrifice ratio is the cost (output loss) incurred in the economy in an attempt to fight inflation. 
Chapter 1. Exchange Rate Regimes and Inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa 23 
Another major finding in this paper is the inflation persistence in the CFA 
countries. As shown by the coefficient of the lag inflation in Tables 4, 5, and 6, there 
is remarkable inflation inertia in the CFA zones. The magnitude 0. 7 (0.6 for the fixed 
effect estimation) of the coefficient of ,.,,_1 indicates that 70 (or 60) percent of the 
current inflation is due to the past inflation history. The histories of output growth 
and money growth have less effect on current inflation compared to the past inflation 
itself. This finding on the inflation inertia in the CFA zones endorses Chopra (1985) and 
Loungani and Swage! (2001) who showed that inertial components are more influential 
in the inflation process in developing countries, especially those with fixed exchange 
rate regimes. 
In summary, the CFA countries exhibit lower inflation relative to their coun-
terparties. Thus the hypothesis of a lower inflation under a fixed ERR is proven for 
the CFA countries. Nevertheless, the Friedman hypothesis that predicts more loss of 
output under a fixed ERR relative to a flexible ERR holds also for the sample of the 
CFA countries (see estimation results and Figure 3). These two theories indicate that 
the inflation-growth trade-off is at work in the CFA zones. However, the goal of an 
economic policy in any country is to increase the wellbeing of its citizens. Given the 
empirically proven fact that the costs associated to maintaining lower inflation out-
weigh its benefits on the country's welfare, one can conclude that fixing the foreign 
value of their currency is distortive to the CFA countries' economies. Hence, the mon-
etary authorities· of the CFA countries could have use alternative policies to improve 
the countries' welfare rather than lowering inflation. 
1.6 Conclusion 
This paper finds an empirical support for the inflation-growth trade-off associated 
with a fixed exchange rate regime (ERR) in the case of the CFA franc currency union 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Despite the relatively lower inflation in the CFA 
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countries compared to the non-CFA countries of SSA, the CFA countries experience 
output losses through their alignment to a fixed ERR and belonging to a currency 
union. As lowering inflation has less impact on welfare than the change in output, this 
trade-off is detrimental to the CFA economies. In fact, the economic objective of any 
individual is to improve her propensity to consume goods and services. In other words, 
economic policies of countries should be oriented to the improvement of their welfare. 
The CFA countries, could therefore employ alternative policies to avoid the welfare 
loss associated with a fixed ERR, and their alignment to a single currency. The welfare 
loss relative to all other non-CFA countries in general and that relative to the pegged 
non-CFA countries in particular lead to the conclusion that the CFA countries would 
have performed economically better under an alternative ERR, and/ or if they did not 
belong to the CFA currency union. 
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1. 7 Regression Tables 
Table 1.1: The Long Run Inflation Estimation in Sub-Saharan Africa 
81 82 83 84 
018 Robust 018 Robust 018 Robust 018 Robust 
Variables 1ri 1ri 1ri 1ri 1ri 1ri 1ri 1ri 
CFA; -11.3*** -4.7*** -13.3*** -5.1 *** -16.3*** -6.9*** -2.9*** -0.4*** 
(0.692) (0.2) (0.7) (0.2) (0.8) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) 
ConstaJJ.t 15.5*** 8.9*** 17.6*** 9.4*** 20.5*** 11.2*** 7.1 *** 4.6*** 
(0.4) (0.1) (0.4) (0.1) (0.6) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
Obs. 1,026 1,026 891 891 648 648 459 459 
R-sq. 0.21 0.30 0.30 0.43 0.40 0.75 0.34 0.04 
8l1s the CFA versus all other non-CFA, 82 1s the CFA versus the non-CFA-non-pegged ERR, 
83 is the CFA versus the non-CFA-floating ERR, and 84 is the CFA versus non-CFA-Pegged ERR. 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
Table 1.2: The Long Run Growth of Money in Sub-Saharan Africa 
81 82 83 84 
018 Robust 018 Robust 018 Robust 018 Robust 
Variables M2, M2, M2, M2, M2, M2, M2, M2, 
CFA, -10.7*** -7.6*** -12.2*** -9.5*** -16.6*** -10.9*** -5.3*** -7.1*** 
(0.7) (0.3) (0.7) (0.5) (0.7) (0.5) (0.5) (0.3) 
Constant 20.7*** 16.3*** 22.3*** 18.6*** 26.6*** 19.7*** 15.3*** 15.6*** 
(0.3) (0.2) (0.4) (0.3) (0.5) (0.3) (0.4) (0.2) 
Obs. 1,053 1,053 891 891 648 648 486 486 
R-sq. 0.23 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.45 0.46 0.21 0.6 
SliB the CFA versus all other non-CFA, 82 IS the CFA versus the non-CFA-non-pegged ERR, 
83 is the CFA versus the non-OF A-floating ERR; and 84 is the CFA versus non-CFA-Pegged ERR. 
The dependent variable is the average growth of M2 growth. 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 1.3: The Long Run Growth of the RGDP per capita in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
81 82 83 84 
OL8 Robust OL8 Robust OL8 Robust OL8 Robust 
Variables Yi Yi Yi Yi Yi Yi Yi Yi 
CFA, -0.1 -1.0*** -0.2 -0.7*** 0.6 -1.3*** 0.2 -1.7*** 
(0.4) (0.1) (0.5) (0.1) (0.4) (0.2) (0.5) (0.15) 
Constant 4.8*** 3.6*** 4.9*** 3.3*** 4.1 *** 4.0*** 4.5*** 4.3*** 
(0.2) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (0.4) (0.12) 
Obs. 1,053 1,053 891 891 648 648 486 486 
R-sq. 0.00 0.049 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.21 
Sl IS the CFA versus all other non-CFA, 82 is the CFA versus the non-CFA-non-pegged ERR, 
S3 is the CFA versus the non-CFA-floating ERR, and S4 is the CFA versus non-CFA-Pegged ERR. 
The dependent variable is the average growth of RGDP per capita. 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
Table 1.4: Long Run Money Velocity Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 
81 82 83 84 
OL8 Robust OL8 Robust OL8 Robust OL8 Robust 
Variables v, v, v, v, vi - v, v, v, 
CFA, 3.6*** 1.6*** 4.3*** 2.2*** 1.9*** 1.3*** 0.8** -0.3 
(0.36) (0.21) (0.40) (0.21) (0.30) (0.21) (0.4) (0.2) 
Constant 0.5*** 1.5*** -0.1 0.9*** 2.2*** 1.8*** 3.4*** 3.4*** 
(0.20) (0.12) (0.23) (0.13) (0.21) (0.15) (0.3) (0.2) 
.Obs. 1,026 1,026 891 891 648 648 459 459 
R-sq. 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.00 
Sl 1s the CFA versus all other non-CFA, 82 1s the CFA versus the non-CFA-non-pegged ERR, 
S3 is the CFA versus the non-CFA-floating ERR, and S4 is the CFA versus non-CFA-Pegged ERR. 
The dependent variable is the average growth of money velocity. 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 1.5: Short Run Inflation Estimation: CFA vs. All NonCFA Countries 
Pooled Pa.nel OLS FE Pooled Panel OLS Pooled Panel OLS 
VARIABLES 1f"it 1fit 'lrit 1rit 
1fit-1 0.7*** 0.6*** 0.7*** 0.6*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Oper1;, -0.01 0.02 -0.003 -0.005 
(0.01) (0.02) (O.Dl) (0.01) 
TT,, 2.3*** 2.4*** 2.4*** 2.6*** 
(0.7) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8) 
CFA, -3.1 *** -3.2*** -3.5*** 
(1.02) (1.13) (1.13) 
growthM2,,_1 0.04 0.05* 
(0.02) (0.02) 




Constant 2.4* 0.3 1.3 1.6 
(1.4) (1.9) (1.6) (1.6) 
Observations 807 807 723 713 
R-squared 0.41 
Number of Groups 37 37 37 37 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 1.6: Short Run Inflation Estimation: CFA users vs. Non-CFANonP,gs 
Pooled Panel OLS FE Pooled Panel OLS Pooled Panel OLS 
VARJABLES 1rit 1fit 1fit 1fit 
7Tit-1 0.7*** 0.6*** 0.7*** 0.6*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Open;, -0.007 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
TT,, 2.3*** 2.6*** 2.8*** 2.8*** 
(0.8) (0.9) (0.8) (0.8) 
CFA, -3.3*** -2.1 * -2.1 ** 
(1.1) (1.1) (1.1) 
growthM2,,_1 0.100*** 0.191 *** 
(0.03) (0.03) 




Constant 2.5* 0.2 -0.2 -0.05 
(1.5) (2.04) (1.5) (1.5) 
Observations 726 726 692 691 
R-squared 0.42 
Number of Groups 32 32 32 32 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 1.7: Short Run Inflation Estimation: CFA users vs. NonCFAFloating 
Pooled Panel OLS FE Pooled Panel OLS Pooled Panel OLS 
VARIABLES 1fit 1rit 1rit 1rit 
'lrit-1 0.7*** 0.6*** 0.7*** 0.6*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Open,, -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
TT;, 2.3*** 2.6*** 2.8*** 2.8*** 
(0.8) (0.9) (0.8) (0.8) 
CFA; -3.3*** -2.1* -2.1 ** 
(1.1) (1.1) (1.1) 
growthM2,,_1 0.1 *** 0.2*** 
(0.03) (0.03) 
GrowthRGDP,,_1 -0.03 -0.03 
(0.03) (0.03) 
M2Velocity ,,_1 -0.002 
(0.004) 
Constant 2.5* 0.2 -0.2 -0.05 
(1.51) (2.04) (1.53) (1.5) 
Observations 726 726 692 691 
R-squared 0.42 
Number of Groups 32 32 32 32 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 1.8: Short Run Inflation Estimation: CFA users vs. NonCFAPegged 
Pooled Panel OLS FE Pooled Panel OLS Pooled Panel OLS 
VARIABLES 1fit 1fit 'lrit 1fit 
1fit~l 0.2*** 0.2*** 0.2*** 0.2*** 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Ope14, 0.03*** 0.04* 0.03*** 0.04* 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
TT,, 0.1 0.3 -0.02 0.5 
(0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8) 
CFA; -1.5 -2.5* 
(1.1) . (1.5) 
growthM2,,_1 -0.03 -0.02 
(0.02) (0.02) 
GrowthRGDP,,_, -0.01 -0.01 
(0.02) (0.02) 
M2VelocitYit-1 -0.02 -0.21 ** 
(0.04) (0.08) 
Constant 2.5 0.8 3.1* 1.8 
(1.6) (1.6) (1.8) (1.7) 
0 bservations 365 365 327 327 
R-squared 0.06 0.11 
Number of id 17 17 17 17 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Figure 1.1: the Convergence of Inflation Rates between the CFA and Non-CFA Gronps 
in SSA 
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1.8 Figures 
Figure 1.2: The Annual Average Real Interest rates (RIR): CFA vs. Non-CFA 
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Figure 1.4: The Average Investment per Capita: CFA vs. Non-CFA, and Non-CFA 
pegged ERR 
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1.9 Appendix III: The Model by Kamin (1997) 
Kamin (1997) studies the linkage between inflation and the ERR for Asian, indus-
trialized and Latin American countries. The author constructes an inflation model that 
incorporate the real GDP gap, nominal and real exchange rate as follows: 
!';.P, = -a:>...,P + A.rer,_1 + aA.E(Qh- Qh)t-l + (1- a)LJ.P,* + (1- a)/';.e, + f3/';.P,_ 1 
where, /';. is the difference operator, P, is the log of domestic CPI; rer is the log of 
real exchange rate; Qh is the log of actual domestic output; Qh is the log of potential 
output in domestic country; P,* is the log of foreign average weighted CPI, e,_, is the 
log of nominal exchange rate (local current per dollar US). t is current time index, 
while t- 1 is the lag indicator (see Kamin, 1997 for the derivation of equation (4)). 
Equation ( 4) is a short run inflation equation. To estimate equation for the sample 
of SSA, I use GDP deflator inflation, and I obtained the potential GDP by applying 
the Rodrick-Prescott filter methodology. Though not reported here, the estimation of 
equation ( 4) shows that the CFA countries have only 0.6 percent less GDP inflation in 
the short run compared to the non-CFA. Using the GDP deflator to estimate the long 
run equation (3) gives similar results as using the CPI inflation above. 
Chapter 2 
The Implications of HO and IRS 




The international trade flows within Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries have 
been low historically relative to both, the region's trade flows with other regions and 
trade within other regions. The issue of the low demand for goods and services across 
borders in SSA has been stressed in the literature and different authors suggest different 
potential causes for the issue. Among others, tariff and non-tariff barriers, poor trans-
port infrastructures, and poor private participations have been underlined to explain 
the issue (e.g., Alemayehu and Haile, 2008; Buys, Uwe, and Wheeler, 2010). Manner 
and Behar (2007) point out that the share of SSA countries' inter-regional trade in their 
total trade volume exceeds 80 percent. They argue that the lower trade within the re-
gion is due to tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The gravity equation predicts lower trade 
flows within SSA relative to trade between SSA and the rest of the world. Faezeh and 
Pritchett (1993) compare the actual intra-SSA trade to the predictions of the gravity 
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equation. They construct a gravity equation in which the trade volume between two 
countries is a function of the trade potential1 of each of the countries and the trade 
attraction2 between them. Using import and export data from the UNCOMTRADE 
at the 3-digit SITC level, they find that the predictions3 of the gravity equation are 
similar to the actual trade within SSA. 
Hanink and Owusu (1998) develop the trade intensity index on the basis of a 
spatial interaction model to examine the trade within the economic community of West 
African States (ECOWAS). Their results show that ECOWAS has failed to promote 
trade between its members. Mansoor et al. (1989) measure trade potential as the value 
of SSA's import from the rest of the world for products that at least one SSA country 
is significantly exporting (significantly means, the value of imports represents at least 1 
percent of that country's total exports to the rest of the world). For instance, suppose 
SSA is importing a given good g from the rest of the world at time t and the import 
value is one thousand (dollar U.S.). Suppose further that, at this particular timet, a 
SSA country i is exporting this same good g to the rest of the world and one thousand 
(dollar U.S.) represents at least 1 percent of i's total export value in good g. Then one 
thousand (dollar U.S.) is the value of trade potential that is not exploited within the 
region. They use the disaggregated UNCOMTRADE data at 4-digit SITC and find 
that the intra-SSA trade potential was only 16 percent of the region's total export in 
1983. 
The literature has thoroughly demonstrated that the imports between SSA 
countries are low. However, no author has investigated the implications of the region's 
factor endowments and its level of product differentiation in explaining the lack of 
1Their measure of a country's trade potential includes factors such as economic size, GDP per 
capita, trade intensity-the ratio of trade to GDP, and the geography of the country (area, island or 
not island). 
2 The trade attraction is estimated from the distance between the two countries as the proxy for 
the transport cost, common language, and political barriers to trade. 
3The actual imports and exports within SSA were respectively 8.1 and 4.5 percent of the region's 
trade with the rest of the world, while the predictions of the gravity equation were 7.5 for imports and 
4.5 percent for exports. 
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comparative advantage in production within SSA and understanding why trade flows 
remain low in this region. The dllference in factor endowment proportions and the ex-
tent of product dllferentiation are important in enhancing trade between countries. The 
high volatility in the prices of world primary commodities and the resulting dramatic 
disturbances in African trade during the last decade have led Breton et al. (2011)4 to 
conclude that the key development solution for Africa remains export diversification. 
Although not empirically explained, producing differentiated products is one of the 
main challenges African countries must undertake to boost their regional trade. 
The debate about the regional trade in SSA remains one of the critical issues 
when it comes to economic development. The importance of this issue has led regional 
leaders to engage in multilateral free trade agreements and subdivide the region into 
overlapping custom unions and free trade areas. Despite all arrangements to boost 
regional trade, import flows in SSA remain low. In fact, imports of Africans from 
Africans have never exceeded 20 percent of the region's imports from the remaining 
world nor has it exceeded a quarter of the region's exports towards the rest of the world 
(see details in the next section). 
The goal of this paper is to examine the driving forces of bilateral trade 
within SSA. In particular, I investigate whether the regional trade of SSA arises from 
cross-product specialization resulting from differences in factor abundances (Heckscher-
Ohlin) or from intra-industry trade resulting from increasing returns to scale (IRS) pro-
duction technology and product differentiation. My results show that the differences in 
factor endowment ratios within SSA are low, which indicates trade does not arise from 
cross-product specialization. In fact, SSA countries exhibit similar factor endowment 
proportions. 60 percent of the region's imports are made of homogeneous goods. The 
average regional Grubel-Lioyd index is low5 (0.03) over the period I consider. The 
4Africa Trade Policy Notes No. 15 - The Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Depart-
ment of the Africa Region of the World Bank. 
5 Note that the maximum Grube! Lloyd index is 1, thus the SSA regional Grube! Lloyd is 0.03 out 
of 1. 
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low value of the Grubel-Lloyd index indicates that there is less possibility of exchang-
ing varieties of differentiated goods. The limited patterns of product varieties cannot 
generate intra-industry trade within the region. This paper shows that the conditions 
for specialization in production under both HO and IRS theories are not met in SSA. 
There is little room for potential trade within SSA. The empirical results in this paper 
imply that industrialization and manufacturing different product varieties is crucial in 
boosting the region's trade in the long run. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow: Section 2 gives an historical 
overview of trade in SSA. Section 3 briefly reviews the literature on trade theories. 
Section 4 outlines the methodology, explains the model, and summarizes the data and 
sources. Section 5 shows the investigation results and their implications while section 
6 concludes the paper. Tables and Figures are provided in separate sections. 
2.2 Overview of Sub-Saharan African Trade 
2.2.1 Product Composition of Sub-Saharan Africa Trade 
The bilateral imports of non-fuel products of African countries from other African 
countries are mainly composed of primary commodities. These commodities are agricul-
tural goods and manufactured6 goods that mainly consist of consumer goods. Although 
primary commodities, the composition of the African products has changed over the 
last decades. This change in the composition of the goods in SSA has remarkably af-
fected the rate of imports within the region. In fact, between 1970 and the late 1980s, 
a large proportion of commodities traded in SSA consisted of agricultural goods. The 
6 Note that the manufactured goods used in this section do not include machinery and transport 
equipment. The reason for the exclusion is because a large portion of machinery and transport 
equipment imported within SSA are products of China and India. In recent decades, trade has 
intensified between India, China, and Africa. As Broadman (2007) explains, this increased partnership 
is due to the economic complementarities between the two regions. The Asian countries essentially 
export machinery and transport equipment towards some key African countries (i.e., South Africa and 
Nigeria). From these countries, these products are exported to other countries in the region (Kaplinsky 
et a!., 2006). 
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share of manufactured goods was low relative to that of the agricultural goods up to 
the late 1980s (Figure 1). Noticeably, over that decade the total import level within 
SSA was stagnant and low as shown in Figure 2. 
From the late 1980s, the share of manufacturing goods in the total import 
increased. The proportion of the manufactured goods in the total imports value within 
SSA surpassed that of the agricultural goods in the mid-1990s. As shown in Figure 2, 
the curve of intra-SSA imports changed from being flat. It is upward sloping. There 
is an argument that the observed dramatic increase in the SSA regional imports in the 
2000s results from the increase in the world demand for primary commodities, which 
inflated their prices (see Gupta and Yang, 2006; Breton et al., 2011). 
However, during the 1990s, even though there was not such a huge increase 
in the world demand for primary commodities, the trend of the regional imports had 
started to increase then. The moderate increase in the intra-SSA imports in the 1990s 
was mainly due to the growth in manufactured goods over that period. As shown in 
Figure 1, in the mid - 1990s, the share of manufactured goods surpassed that of the 
agricultural goods in the total imports within SSA. In addition, there was a new trend 
of an increase in the share of the manufactured goods beginning from the year 2000. 
Although the rise in world demand for primary commodities significantly contributed 
to the increase in imports within the region, a portion of this increase can be explained 
by the growth in the share of manufactured products in the total regional trade around 
that period. The reason is, even though the imports dropped after the unusual world 
demand, the regional imports were still higher compared to their levels before the mid 
- 1990s. These higher imports after the unusual event were essentially due to the 
growing share of manufactured goods relative to the share of agricultural goods in the 
total regional imports. 
The above overview of the non-fuel commodities trade within SSA shows two 
main points. First, commodities prices in SSA depend on world prices and so they 
are vulnerable to external shocks. This is essentially because the commodities of SSA 
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consist in general of primary commodities. The second point is that manufacturing has 
positive effects on imports within SSA. These facts highlight the importance of product 
differentiation in enhancing bilateral trade in SSA. Indeed, manufacturing goods is 
the basis for product differentiation. SSA countries should shift their products from 
primary commodities to high value added ones and produce them in different varieties. 
Product differentiation will allow not only boosting the intra-regional demands, but 
also reducing the region's vulnerability to world primary commodities prices change. 
2.2.2 Trade within SSA versus Trade of SSA with the Rest of 
the World 
Historically, SSA countries trade a smaller share of their GDP among themselves 
relative to the portion of GDP that they share with the rest of the world. To identify 
how much are imports within SSA relative to SSA's imports from (exports to) the rest 
of the world, I use aggregated data at UNCOMTRADE (1- digit SITC) to compute the 
total export (import) values of SSA towards (from) the rest of the world per year, and 
the yearly total intra- regional import value of SSA. Figures 3 and 4 provide respectively, 
the ratio of intra-SSA imports to SSA 's exports to the world, and intra-SSA imports to 
SSA's imports from the rest of the world. The observation reveals that imports within 
SSA have always been smaller than the region's trade (both import and export) with 
the remaining world. 
SSA imports more from the world than within itself. As shown in Figure 4, the 
proportion of the intra-regional imports in SSA's imports from outside the region has 
been historically less than 10 percent. This proportion reached 20 percent in the mid-
2000s due to the worldwide increase in demand for primary commodities and the growth 
of manufactured goods share in the regional trade (see Gupta and Yang, 2006; Breton 
et al., 2011). Both, the ratios of regional imports to external exports and imports 
increased from the late 80s to the mid - 2000s and then declines in the following years. 
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The periods of increase and decrease in these ratios coincide with the period when the 
share of manufacturing goods increased and declined. Thus, manufacturing can. explain 
some part of the success in trade within SSA. 
Despite the contribution of manufacturing to the regional trade enhancement, 
trade within SSA is still not a grand success. Even though the share of manufactured 
goods in the regional production has increased over the last decades, more than 60 per-
cent of the region's product consists of non-manufactured goods; and imports within 
SSA remain largely low compared to the region's trades with the rest of the world. This 
indicates that the level of manufacturing is still too low to highly promote trade in the 
region. The inability of SSA countries to add more value to their products ( manufac-
tured goods in a large extent) can be explained by the market access constraints that 
these countries face. SSA countries are distant from developed markets from where 
they import capital equipment and intermediate goods required for production. For 
instance, Redding and Venables (2004) find that each 10 percent increase in ad valorem 
transport costs of final output and intermediates goods is associated with a 30 percent 
reduction in value added in the domestic country. Countries facing higher transport 
costs (i.e., countries suffering from large markets and supplier access issues) are less 
likely to produce high value added goods. In this paper, I examine how the extent of 
manufacturing goods in different varieties and the difference in factors of production 
proportions explain the level of demand across borders within SSA. 
2.3 A Brief Literature Review on Bilateral Trade 
Theories 
Despite the improvement in trade within SSA during the last decades, the trade 
flows within the region are still low. Different factors might explain the persistence 
of the issue. This paper focuses on analyzing the factor endowments differences- the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory and the extent of product differentiation within SSA to explain 
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why the regional trade is still low. The Heckscher-Ohlin model is the trade theory ini-
tiated by Heckscher (1919) and reformulated by Ohlin (1933). This theory provides a 
basis for empirical analysis of the origins of comparative advantage. The model pro-
poses that international differences in factor endowments are sources of comparative 
advantage under two key assumptions: (1) the immobility of the factors of production 
across borders: factors are immobile across borders but move freely across industries 
within a country, (2) factor abundance does differ across countries but does not differ 
too much so that countries are within the factor price equalization (FPE) set. The 
relative factor endowment differences can lead to comparative advantage in the pro-
duction of goods and services across countries. Within an industry this will reflect the 
relative intensity of one factor over others in the production of a good or the marginal 
rate of substitution between factors in the production process. 
For bilateral trade to be enhanced within SSA, the countries must specialize in 
particular goods or services in the production of which they have a comparative advan-
tage over other countries. According to the HO theory, countries export the goods that 
they produce intensively with their abundant factor. Thus, a labor abundant country 
will specialize in and export goods that require labor intensively in their production 
while a capital abundant country will specialize in and export a good that requires cap-
ital intensively in the production process. In the case where two countries have similar 
factor endowments, they tend to trade less with each other because the production 
prices of goods are similar across the two countries. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin model assumes that different combinations of the produc-
tion factors are used in the production of different goods. Based on the HO theory, if 
a country is abundant in factors that are used intensively in the production of a given 
good, this country will have a comparative advantage in the production of that good 
over other countries. Thus, this country would specialize in the production of this good 
and export it to other countries that produce the good with higher costs. 
Bilateral trade between two countries can also be intensified as a result of 
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product differentiation where the love of varieties creates demand for products across 
countries. Krugman (1979) initiates the theoretical framework for the idea of product 
differentiation under the assumptions of increasing returns to scale (IRS) production 
technology and monopolistic competition. Krugman's contribution has been extended 
by a wide range of works (i.e., Krugman, 1980; Bergstrand, 1989; Eaton and Kortum, 
2002; Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008). This type of trade has been proven to 
be the driving force of bilateral trade among industrialized nations. Helpman (1987) 
and Dabaere (2002}' show that a large portion of trade between developed nations is 
made up of trade between industries producing different varieties of a product. One of 
the primary objectives of this paper is to study whether the IRS theory is relevant to 
trade within SSA. 
The HO and IRS theories are the foundations for empirical investigations on 
international trade patterns. Moreover, the gravity equation which remains the most 
successful model in explaining the variations in trade volume between countries, can be 
derived from both of these two theories (e.g., Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Evenett 
and Keller, 2002). In the following sections, I employ Evenett and Keller's framework 
to study the driving forces of trade within the SSA, and identify whether this region 
exhibits opportunities for international trade based on the two theories. 
2.4 Methodologies 
I follow the empirical strategies of Evenett and Keller (2002) who tackle the factor 
endowment difference and the increasing return to scale theories of trade in a framework 
of the gravity equations. They study to what extent each of the theories explains the 
7Helpman (1987) uses a gravity model and provided support that the trade volume within a region 
relative to the regional GDP is proportional to the dispersion index that measures the regional degree 
of intra-industry trade. Debaere (2002) examines the results of Helpman (1987) on the samples of 
14 OECD countries where product differentiation is of great importance and another sample of Non 
OECDs with less differentiated goods. He concludes that the increasing similarity in GDP among the 
OECD countries leads to higher bilateral trade whose large proportion consists of intra-industry trade. 
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volume of bilateral trade. I apply their methodology to the bilateral trade within SSA 
region and compare it with that of other regions8 The model of Evenett and Keller 
(2002) is convenient under the goals of this paper because it can test the endowment 
based issue and product differentiation from a single framework of a gravity equation. 
2.4.1 Trade Theories and the Gravity Equation 
Under the assumptions of perfect specialization, identical and homothetic prefer-
ences, and frictionless trade, one can derive a gravity equation, in which the value of 
imports of a country i from a country j at time t is proportional to the product of the 




where Mijt, Y", yjt, and ywt are respectively, imports of country i from country 
), GDP of country i, GDP of country j and the world's GDP at timet (hereafter, 
superscripts i, and j represent country indexes and t is the time index). This paper 
modifies equation (1) to apply it to intra-regional trade. 
i ., yrt yityjt 
MJ = ywty;:i (2.2) 
where, yrt is the regional GDP (hereafter, superscript r represents the regional in-
dex). Equation (1) or (2) above have very important theoretical features. They hold as 
long as countries completely specialize in different products. Moreover, these equations 
can be derived from the product differentiation, complete specialization across varieties, 
as well as the cross-industry specification arising from factor endowment differences. 
The increasing return to scale theory states that the love of varieties is what 
creates demand for goods across borders. However, each country demands the varieties 
8East and South Asia, Europe and North America, Latin America and Caribbean, and the Middle 
East and North Africa. 
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of differentiated goods from its partners relative to its GDP. If the two countries pro-
duce a common good ( Z) (homogeneous good) and different varieties of another good 
(X) (differentiated product), then each·country will import different varieties of the 
differentiated good from the other country, but not the common good. Based on iden-
tical and homothetic preferences, the quantity of the varieties of goods that country i 
imports from j is a function of i's share of world GDP, which in this case is: Y" /Yrt. 
Nevertheless, the quantity of product varieties country i expects to import from j is 
reduced as the share of homogeneous goods between the two countries increases. 
The reason why bilateral trade between the countries declines in the presence 
of a homogeneous good is the following: suppose the two partner countries produce 
a given amount of a homogeneous commodity Z. The shares of the good Z in i and 
j's GDPs are respectively Z' and zj. Country i's share of varieties in its GDP is 
(1- Z")Y". Thus, i's share of world market is (1- Z")Y"/Y"". If there were no 
common good produced in both countries, the importing country would import all 
varieties from the partner at the full value of its share in the world GDP (Y" /Yw'). In 
this case, equation (2) where the coefficient of the right hand side is unity would hold. 
That is, i imports one hundred percent of the different varieties from j so does j from 
i. With the existence of common good Z, the total imports of i from j is reduced by 
the share Z''- Incorporating the share of homogeneous goods in equation (2) gives: 
yrt yityjt 
M'}' = (1- zit)---
ywt yrt 
(2.3) 
We would expect high regression coefficients for country pairs where products 
are differentiated than for country pairs with large shares of homogeneous goods. That 
is: for Z" > 0 , the trade volume between partners declines. Consequently, countries 
with high Grube! Lloyd index will tend to have a high alpha (a"), where a" = (1- Z''). 
Equation (3) holds perfectly to test trade based on the endowment proportion dif-
ferences between countries as well. In the world of two countries, two goods, and two 
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factors Heckscher-Ohlin model, each country exports the good that uses intensively its 
abundant factors. If country i and j are respectively capital and labor abundant and 
produce two homogeneous goods Z and X, the first country will export capital intensive 
goods and the second country will export labor intensive goods. Suppose the production 
of good X requires more capital and less labor than the production of good Z. Both of 
the goods are produced in both countries. The amounts of X and Z produced in coun-
try i are X'' j(X''+Z") and Z"j(X''+Z'') with X'' /(X"+Z") > Z" j(X'' + Z''). On 
the other hand, country j produces the shares z;t j(X;'+Z;') and X;' j(X;'+z;t) with 
z;t j(X;t + z;t) > X;'/(X;t + z;'). Country i exports a demanded proportion a? of its 
production Xit. Thus, the world market share-of country i is: Mijt = (ax/ Xit)~: v;;t 
, and the market share of country j is : Miit = ( az j zit)~: v;;t. 
Let I" = ax I X" and ljt = az I z;t. It follows, 
Miit _ ( x;xit) yrt yityjt _ it yrt yityjt 
- 0: ywt yrt - { ywt yrt (3'), 
and 
Miit _ ( zjzit) yrt yityjt _ Jt yrt yityjt 
- 0: ywt yrt - { ywt yrt (3"), 
where ax in equation (3') and az in equation (3") are respectively the quantity of 
good X demanded by country j from country i and the quantity of good Z demanded 
by country i from country j. 
From the above demonstration, we would expect lit and l;t to be higher when 
the capital to labor ratios differ sharply across the two countries at a particular time 
t. This is because the large difference in factor endowments will cause each country 
to specialize in the production of the good it produces intensively with its abundant 
factor, and rely on its partner for the consumption of the other good. By relying 
on each other, the demand increases between the two countries. Therefore, 1" and 
l;t decrease when endowment ratio differences between the countries decline. In the 
extreme case if both countries are capital or labor abundant, ax or az will tend to 
zero. This will characterize the "zero trade" case in a Heckscher-Ohlin model when 
endowments are identical. The coefficient lit and l;t from estimating equations (3', 3") 
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are expected to be smaller when factor endowments are similar or/and when products 
are not differentiated (i.e., in the presence of large shares of homogeneous goods). 
Additional modifications from equations (1), (2), and (3) are the inclusion of 
the dummy for common language - if the two countries have a common official language 
(CLijr); the dummy for colonial links if the importing country was a colony (Colijr ); 
the dummy for contiguity if the two countries share a common border ( Contigiir ); the 
log ofthe distance between the two countries (Dijr) and the landlocked dummy (LLijr 
). After inclusion of these control variables and taking the log function, equation (3) 
becomes: 
•t •t 
Log(Mijtr) = oi'r +ai'r Log( Y' Y' )+f3CLijr +15Col'jr +8Contigijr +{)Log(Dijr)+pLLijr +<ijtr 
yrt . 
(2.4) 
where the constant term ( a"r) captures ytr /Yw'- This paper estimates equation 
(4) using a panel pooled ordinary least square (OLS). Baltagi and Khanti-Akom (1990) 
stress that the Haussmann-Taylor (hereafter, HT) (1981) estimation methodology is 
the best estimator for equations where potential correlation might exist between the 
explanatory variables and the individual specific effects. Baltagi and Khanti-Akom 
(1990) argue that with the HT estimation methodology, the within transformation 
does not eliminate the individual effects and it corrects the within estimator when 
individual effects are correlated with the explanatory variables. 
Another way to recover individual specifics is the use of fixed effect estimation. 
However, the fixed effect estimation automatically drops the time invariant variables. 
This is an issue with the gravity estimations where country specifics such as distance 
between countries, the common language, or common border between two countries or 
landlocked dummies are time invariant. If the time invariant variables are uncorrelated 
with the country pair effects, then one can recover the fixed effects using the two 
stage least square (2SLS) (i.e., estimate OLS on the residuals of fixed effect regression 
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(Baltagi, 2009)). For these econometric reasons, some gravity estimations have recently 
employed the HT estimation methodology. For instance, Serlenga and Shin (2007) 
estimate the gravity equation of bilateral trade among 15 European countries using the 
HT estimation methodology. They argue that in addition to recovering the country 
specific effects of variables such as distance, common border, and common language, 
the HT methodology allows these variables to be endogeneous. 
Even though the HT methodology tackles the endogeneity problem, I use the 
pooled OLS because the type of gravity equation I nse in this paper allows little corre-
lation between the explanatory variable and the dummies (country specifics). Serlenga 
and Shin (2007) use GDP, the differences in relative factor endowment between trad-
ing partners (RLF), dummy on similarity in relative size (SIM), dummy on European 
community membership (CEE), common currency (EMU) and the common language 
dummies as the endogeneous variable when applying the HT methodology. Obviously, 
the design of their gravity equation exhibits potential endogeneity and it is reasonable 
for them to use the HT estimator. GDP, the relative country size and the difference in 
relative endowment could be correlated. In addition, most of the 15 European countries 
in their sample are members of the "CEE" and the "EMU". 
The gravity equation by Evenett and Keller (2002) used in this paper is designed 
in such a way that the main explanatory variables are combined in the countries' sizes. 
The endowments proportion differences are intended to be part of the GDP and be 
reflected through the coefficient of the estimation. The main explanatory variable in 
this gravity equations, yityjt ;yrt turns out to be less correlated with the dummies 
which reflect the country specifics. The matrix of correlation between the variables is 
given in Table 8 and the results from estimating equation (4) are stored in Table 6. 
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2.4.2 The Data Summary 
The overview of the historical trade in SSA is observed over the period from 
1970 through 2007 using aggregated data at the 1-digit SITC of the UNCOMTRADE 
database. However, due to the lack of historical data on the capital stock and the labor 
force, for the empirical investigation I use a panel of eleven years (from 1997 to 2007) 
on 136 countries9 grouped into five regions.10 The bilateral trade data is retrieved from 
the IMF's direction of trade (DOT) and UNCOMTRADE. The data on real gross 
domestic product (RGDP) converted into purchasing power parity (PPP), the capital 
stock, the labor force, and the population is retrieved from the IMF's International 
Financial Statistics (IFS). The gross capital formation was retrieved from the World 
Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) data and is adjusted by the depreciation 
rate of 6 percent. The gross capital formation is used as a proxy for countries' capital 
stock. 
The data includes countries with valid data on capital stock and labor force 
over the indicated period. Note that capital and labor are used as the main factor 
endowments in this paper. Whenever a country lacks the data on capital stock or 
labor force for a given year, the countries pairs in which that country is involved are 
dropped out. This is because the paper is interested in investigating the endowment 
ratio difference across countries. All variables are converted to purchasing power parity 
adjusted in real international dollars to be internationally comparable. The averages of: 
the number of trade relations per importing countries in SSA, the countries' GDP per 
capita, and the capital per worker over the period from 1997 to 2007 are summarized in 
Table 4. The capital to labor ratio is also calculated for countries within each region. 
The maxiroum and minimum capital per worker and the average capital per worker 
within each region between 1997 to 2007 are reported in Table 1. 
9 The list of countries by region is given in Table 9. 
10 Asia, EU -NAM, LAC, MENAF, and SSA denote respectively region of East Asia and Pacific 
and South Asia, Europe and North America, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North 
Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Chapter 2. The Implications of HO and IRB Theories in Sub-Saharan African Trade 50 
This paper follows the literature to test the rates of intra industry trade by 
computing the Grube!-Lloyd index. The data used to calculate the Grube!-Lloyd index 
(1975) is extracted from the UNCOMTRADE database on two-way trade at the 3 
digit level in SITC. To assess the extent of product differentiation, the paper classifies 
the commodities by differentiated and homogeneous goods based on Rauch (1999) and 
Hallak (2006) concordance. Only the differentiated goods are used to calculate the 
Grube! Lloyd index. The average regional Grube! Lloyd index over the period from 
1997 to 2007 is reported in Table 2. 
The Grube!-Lloyd index is computed using the following equation: 
I:; ~~jtr Mjitrj 
GLijtr = 1- [:E 9 l~jtT- ~itrl], where 0 < GLijr < 1 
g g +Mg 
where, g represents a commodity. G Lijtr is the Grube!-Lloyd index and reflects the 
degree of intra-industry trade (imports and exports) of country i from (to) country j. 
M;;tr is the export value from country i to country j in a differentiated good and Mjitr 
is the import value of country i from j in the good g. 
The Grube! Lloyd index reflects the degree of intra-industry trade in differentiated 
goods. This index can be assessed only if a good is simultaneously imported and 
exported by a country from (to) the other country. GLiitr equals zero whenever g is 
either exported or imported only. In contrast, if the value of imports is equal to the 
value of exports in commodity g, then GL'itr equals unity. Therefore, the Grube!-Lloyd 
index allows determining the proportion of intra-industry trade in the regional trades. 
The shares of differentiated and homogeneous goods in the total trade volume as well as 
the capital to labor ratios are calculated to further highlight the nature of endowments 
and the characteristics of goods in SSA trade. This exercise is conducted for all regions 
to facilitate the comparison of SSA to other regions. Note that the relatively higher 
GLijtr index indicates intensive intra-industry trade or the existence of the wide range 
of product varieties tradable between industries across borders. 
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2.5 Results and Interpretation 
2.5.1 The Endowments Proportions and Intra-Industry Trade 
in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The endowment analysis shows that SSA countries are in the majority labor abun-
dant. The ratios of capital to labor within SSA indicate that there is less capital 
available per worker in SSA as compared to that within other regions. On average, the 
value of capital per labor in SSA is 546 ($ U.S.) and it is the lowest as compared to 
the value of capital per worker in other regions (Table 1). Factor endowment ratios are 
similar across countries in SSA than in other regions. The mean difference in the capital 
to labor ratio in SSA is 845 and it is also the lowest among regions. In SSA, the mini-
mum difference in the factor production ratio is between Burundi and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), whereas the maximum difference in this ratio is between 
Equatorial Guinea and Zimbabwe. More than 38 pairs of countries in SSA exhibit no 
significant difference in factor endowment ratios (factor proportion difference is close 
to zero between the countries composing the pair). The endowment ratio within SSA 
indicates that the region is labor abundant rather than capital abundant. Given the 
countries' endowments, the opportunity cost of producing capital intensive goods in 
SSA is high. This indicates the lack of comparative advantage in the production of 
goods within the region. Therefore, specialization in production of goods based on the 
factor endowments is less likely to occur in SSA. 
There are few varieties of differentiated goods traded in SSA. From 1997 to 
2007, the imports of SSA countries from other SSA countries was mainly composed 
of: tobacco; metallic structures; furniture; cotton fabrics; footwear; perfumery and 
cosmetics; fertilizers; road motor vehicles; alcoholic beverages; rubber tires; telecom-
munication equipment; wood simply worked; tools; electric machinery parts; printed 
matter and medicaments. As we can see, the manufactured goods in SSA are mostly 
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consumption goods, not high value added goods. In addition, most of the SSA coun-
tries do not intensively participate in trade in differentiated goods. Over the total 
period of observation, South Africa's share of the total market value in differentiated 
goods is almost 50 percent. The remaining countries have shares of market value which 
are less than 5 percent (Table 5). The lower participation and the limited patterns of 
differentiated goods are indications of the less extent of differentiated goods and the 
low trade within the region. 
Intra-industry trade is ahnost missing in SSA. The average regional Grube! 
Lloyd index - which measures the rate of trade between industries across borders, is 
low in SSA compare to that of other regions (Table 2). The average Grube! Lloyd 
index is 0.03 in SSA and the index is zero for more than 60 percent of the countries 
over many years. The lack of intra- industry trade reflects the fact that products 
are not differentiated in the region. Thus, specialization based on the IRS theory 
cannot take place under these conditions. The factor endowment and increasing return 
to scale theories of trade explain why SSA countries trade less among themselves. 
Based on the HO theory the lower difference in factor proportions cannot generate 
perfect specialization within SSA whereas the absence of product differentiation reduces 
bilateral trade. 
The low extent of product differentiation in SSA can be explained by the lack 
of technology which is known as the driving factor of labor productivity. Whether new 
technologies are available or not in the production process in SSA, their application 
requires skilled labor force. However, SSA has a very small share of its labor force that 
can be considered as skilled workers. In fact, using the education level of individuals 
as the proxy for their skills, the percentage of people aged 15 and older with secondary 
education as well as the percentage of population aged 25 and above with tertiary 
education are negligeable in SSA compared to that in other regions (Table 3). 
In fact, the proportion of skilled workers in the total labor force matters to 
the extent of how countries trade. The degree of trade between two countries turns 
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out to also depend on the skills in both countries. In the Tables (10, 11, 12) in the 
Appendix Annex, I use the total proportion of people aged 15 and above as a proxy for 
the skilled labor. Then, I merged all pairs from all regions to create five v classes: (1) 
with v increasing by the increasing order of education in the importing country (Table 
10); (2) v increasing by the increasing order of education in the exporting country 
(Table 11); and (3) v increasing by the increasing order of the sum of the proportions 
of education in both countries (Table 12). 
After estimating equation 4, the results show that the proportions of educated 
people in both, the partner countries matter to trade between them. The coefficient 
of yityjt ;yrt in Table 12 increases as v increases. However, the effect of education on 
trade is not clear in Tables 10 and 11. The order of the coefficients of yityjt ;yrt in 
Tables 10 and 11 are ambiguous. This can be explained by the fact that v is ranked 
only by the education in one country of the pair. So, the other country forming the pair 
might have lower or higher level of education, leading to an ambiguous effect. From 
this point of view, with the lower level of education within SSA, the lower extent of 
trade in this region is also not surprising. 
2.5.2 The Results from the Gravity Equations 
The coefficient alpha (aitr) from estimating equation (4) is lower for the regions 
where the share of homogeneous goods in total imports is high. It is not surprising 
that Latin America, the Middle East and SSA have similar and low coefficients ( aitr) 
compared to that of Asia and Europe. In fact, Latin America, the Middle East and 
SSA have lower intra industrial trade expressed as small Grube! Lloyd index. More-
over, these regions have higher share of homogeneous goods relative to the shares of 
differentiated goods in their total import. The average difference in the endowment 
proportions for these three regions are lower compared to that of Asian and European 
samples. 
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SSA has the lowest rate of intra industrial trade and the lowest average differ-
ence in the factor endowment ratios. SSA's coefficient alpha ( oitr = 0.04) being similar 
to that of Latin America and slightly greater than that of the Middle East might re--
sult from SSA having relatively higher share of differentiated goods in total imports 
compared to that of the other two regions. This indicates that SSA could trade more 
by differentiating more its products. 
Product differentiation and the relative endowment differences between coun-
tries are critical in enhancing bilateral trade. This is supported as well by the bench-
mark exercise conducted in this paper. I merged all the samples and subdivided it into 
two subsamples using a benchmark of GLijrll = 0.05. The first subsample includes 
pairs countries with GLijr less than 0.05 and the second includes pairs with GLiir 
greater than 0.05. The subsamples include pairs with valid GLijr and difference in 
factor endowment numbers. The sample of lower GL'ir contains 12,502 observations 
and that of higher G Lijr has 18028 observations. I estimate equation ( 4) for each of the 
two subgroups. The coefficient (o/i'r) for the lower GLiir sample is 0.01 and that of the 
higher GLiJr sample is 0.08. Both coefficients are significant at 99 percent confidence 
(Table 7, last row). This indicates a 1 percent increase in the GDPs of countries with 
low GL will increase trade between them by only 1 percent, while similar increase in 
GDP for countries with high GLijr will boost their bilateral trade by 8 percent. The 
difference in the GLiir, which reflects the degree of product differentiation, makes a 
large difference in the trade patterns. · 
In addition, I subdivided each of the two subgroups into five classes named v 
classes (v =1, 2, 3, 4, 5). Within the lower GLiir group, v increases in the increasing 
order of the difference in factor endowment ratios (DFER). Meaning for instance that 
the DFER in the class of v =5 is greater than that of the v =1 class. There are about 
2,500 observations per v class within the low GLijr subgroup. Similar v classes are 
created in the subgroup of the high G Lijr. However, in this group, the v classes are 
11G£ijr without subscript t reflects the period average 
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first ranked by increasing GL'ir order and then by increasing DFER order. The v classes 
of the higher G L'ir have about 3,605 observations each. After creating the v classes, 
I estimate each class sample using equation ( 4) and following the same estimation 
methodology- pooled panel OLS. As shown in Table 7, within the low GLijr sample, 
the estimation coefficients are all significant at 95 percent confidence. These a~ increase 
as the DFER increases and reaches the largest value of 0.012 for the v =4 class. The 
lower coefficient for the v =5 class could result from many pairs having extremely lower 
GLijr despite their higher DFER. 
Similar patterns of the a~ is observed within two class types of the high G Lijr 
sample. For the classes ranked by increasing G Lijr order, the a~ increases as the G Lijr 
rate increases and reaches the maximum at the class of v = 4. In the other ordering 
classes within the high G L ijr, the coefficients seem not to change much across the 
three first classes. But these coefficients are high for the last two classes. Interestingly 
from this analysis, the coefficients (a~) are significant and large in magnitude for all 
classes and ordering within the high GLijr sample than within the low GLijr sample. 
Moreover, within the high GL'ir sample, the higher v classes have higher a~ in each 
of the two ordering. This indicates the importance of product differentiation and the 
relative endowment differences. 
The IRS and the HO explain why trade flows are low in SSA. The lower factor 
endowment ratio differences and the less extent of intra industrial trade cannot generate 
perfect specialization. Given these results, trade policies like custom unions or free trade 
agreements are likely to fail in SSA. SSA countries have similar factors of production, 
they produce homogeneous primary commodities and the level of product differentiation 
is not high enough to allow specialization and increase demand across the border. Trade 
policies to boost trade within SSA must focus on how to manufacture the regional goods 
in different varieties. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
The finding of this paper supports those of the previous works that SSA trades 
less within itself. However, this paper uses the HO and IRS theories to show that the 
lack of comparative advantage in production is an impediment to bilateral trade in 
SSA. I argue that the homogeneity of the factor proportions and the lack of product 
varieties lower demand across borders in SSA. Similar factor endowment ratios and the 
insignificant extent of product differentiation in SSA cannot generate perfect special-
ization and enhance regional trade. Based on these results, trade policies that aimed 
to promote trade within the region (i.e., FTA, custom unions) are likely to fail because 
SSA countries produce similar homogeneous agricultural products. Product differenti-
ation is the key to the success of trade within SSA. The main challenges are therefore 
industrialization and manufacturing products in more varieties. 
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2.7 Tables 
Table 2.1: The Average Regional Capital per Labor, Countries with the 
Minimum aud the Maximum Capital per Labor between 1997 aud 2007 
Capital to Labor Ratio ( C I L) 
Region Name AVVKL1 Min C I L Country Max C I L Country 
Europe and North America 10,043 Romania: 283.7 Norway: 15,216 
East and South Asia 3,746 Afghanistan: 64.7 Australia: 20,509 
Middle East and North Africa 3,234 Djibouti: 147 Emirates: 15,600 
Latin America and Caribbean 2,219 Guyana: 286.5 Bahamas: 15,556.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 546 DRC2 : 7.25 Equatorial Guinea: 18,256 
1 Average value of capital per labor. 
2 The lowest value of cj L between 1997 and 2007 was recorded in Democratic Republic of Congo (7.25 in 1998). 
Source: Author's calculation using WDI database. 
Table 2.2: Regional Grube! Llyod Index, Shares of Differentiated aud Homo-
geneous Goods (1997- 2007) 
Regional Grube! Llyod Index 
Region Name 
Europe and North America 
East and South Asia 
Latin America and Caribbean 
Middle East and North Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
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Table 2.3: The Proportion of Skilled Labor in the Regional Labor Force 
15 Years and Older 25 Years and Older 
' Region Name 1Total 15+ in SS (%) "15+ css (%) 3Total 25+ in TS (%) 425 + CTS (%) 
ASIA 27.3 13.9 
EU andNAM 39.9 20.9 
LAC 26.2 10.9 
MENA 20.3 10.8 
SSA 13.9 4.9 
1Total of people aged 15 and above m Secondary School. 
'People aged 15 and above who completed Secondary School. 
3Total of people aged 25 and above in Tertiary School. 
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Table 2.4: Average Trade Relations, GDP per Capita and Capital to Labor 
Ratio (1997 to 2007) 
Country Name # of Trade Relations GDP/Capita Capital to Labor 
Angola 27 1218 384 
Benin 35 452 209 
Burkina Faso 31 299 124 
Burundi 24 113 20 
Cameroon 35 786 357 
Cape Verde 32 1668 1309 
Central African Republic 30 302 62 
Chad 26 337 216 
Comoros 21 515 126 
Democratic Republic of Congo 32 115 29 
Congo, Republic 35 1265 739 
Cote d'Ivoire 31 763 215 
Equatorial Guinea 20 7433 8337 
Ethiopia 27 148 73 
Gabon 32 5084 2928 
Gambia 32 318 153 
Ghana 32 481 251 
Guinea 34 388 152 
Guinea-Bissau 13 173 63 
Kenya 36 483 179 
Madagascar 35 284 118 
Malawi 31 204 84 
Mali 31 319 278 
Mauritius 35 4430 2486 
Mozambique 31 266 113 
Niger 29 202 87 
Rwanda 32 266 93 
Senegal 35 631 339 
Sierra Leone 29 212 57 
South Africa 36 3904 1938 
Tanzania 36 318 133 
Togo 30 305 127 
Uganda 35 282 132 
Zambia 36 503 276 
Zimbabwe 31 509 126 
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Table 2.5: Statistics on Trade in Differentiated Goods in SSA (1997-2007) 
Reporter Name IV' EVl RMS3 (%) GLJ4 
South Africa 42781.6 6502.3 47.16 0.027 
Kenya 3107.8 1650.9 4.55 0.023 
Zimbabwe 1153.0 3556.7 4.51 0.031 
Mozambique 246.0 4112.8 4.17 0.027 
Nigeria 644.9 3177.5 3.66 0.029 
Cote d'Ivoire 3090.1 679.0 3.61 0.027 
Ghana 609.0 3034.7 3.49 0.027 
Tanzania 475.8 2448.3 2.80 0.025 
Burkina Faso 309.8 2347.3 2.54 0.026 
Mali 73.7 2440.0 2.41 0.026 
Malawi 366.4 2073.4 2.33 0.027 
Mauritius 906.0 1263.2 2.08 0.023 
Senegal 1394.0 756.2 2.06 0.023 
Togo 1024.2 1103.5 2.04 0.029 . 
Uganda 137.8 1584.3 1.65 0.021 
Botswana 993.6 620.8 1.54 0.033 
Benin 652.1 911.7 1.50 0.027 
Madagascar 129.3 1249.1 1.32 0.021 
Cameroon 447.1 819.2 1.21 0.025 
Guinea 38.9 745.3 0.75 0.022 
Gabon 126.5 640.5 0.73 0.022 
Niger 92.2 504.1 0.57 0.024 
Namibia 457.8 58.6 0.49 0.031 
Rwanda 20.9 470.7 0.47 0.025 
Ethiopia 28.2 416.8 0.43 0.024 
Seychelles 37.1 380.4 0.40 0.022 
Gambia 32.5 383.3 0.40 0.022 
Burundi 16.2 306.1 0.31 0.023 
Sierra Leone 21.7 239.0 0.25 0.024 
Guinea-Bissau 28.8 173.2 0.19 0.022 
CAF5 4.5 145.3 0.14 0.020 
Comoros 3.5 119.8 0.12 0.021 
Eritrea 18.2 41.1 0.06 0.024 
Cape Verde 14.3 38.3 0.05 0.022 
So Tom and Prncipe 7.6 10.3 0.02 0.026 
. . .. 1Import Value (million$ U.S.); 2Export Value (nnlhon $U.S.); 
3Regional Market Share; 4 Grubel Llyod index; 5Central African Republic. 
Source: Author's calculation using UNCOMTRADE data. 
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Table 2.6: Estimation of Equation (4) using Pooled Panel OLS 
Asia1 EU-NAM2 LAC3 
VARIABLES Log(Mijtr) Log(Mijtr) Log(Mijtr) 
Log(Yityjt ;yrt) 0.15*** 0.08*** 0.04*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.0003) 
LL'ir 0.32 -2.81 *** -0.06 
(0.63) (0.94) (0.06) 
ContigiJr 2.4** 10.78*** 0.52*** 
(0.93) (1.4) (0.06) 
CL'ir 2.33*** 11.03*** 0.002 
(0.55) (1.46) (0.03) 
Colijr -8.9*** -12.35*** -0.56** 
(2.66) (1.62) (0.29) 
log( Dist'Jr) -0.67** -2.86*** -0.01 ** 
(0.32) (0.45) (0.02) 
Constant 5.06* 22.3*** 0.11 
(2.7) (3.36) (0.18) 
0 bservations 6,170 9,900 6,339 
Number of Groups 606 900 631 
1 East and South Asm; 2Europe and North Amenca 
3Latin America and Caribbean; 4 Middle East and North Mrica·; 
5Su~Saharan Africa. 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
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Table 2.7: Benchmark Case: Estimation of Equation (4) for Different Classes 
of GL and DFER 
HO Model: Low-GL (GL'ji0.05) IRS/HO Model: High-GL (GL'1 i.0.05) 
v,Classes v v v 
V= 1 0.002** 0.013*** 0.088*** 
(0.000825) (0.000432) (0.00220) 
V= 2 0.003** 0.032*** 0.060*** 
(0.00ll9) (0.000594) (0.00204) 
V= 3 O.Oll *** 0.153*** 0.059*** 
(0.000542) (0.00205) (0.00196) 
V= 4 0.012*** 0.265*** 0.136*** 
(0.000699) (0.00413) (0.00397) 
V= 5 0.005*** 0.070*** 0.123*** 
(0.000731) (0.00230) (0.00160) 
All Observations 0.010*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
(0.000334) (O.OOlll) (0.00111) 
1 v, ranked in increasmg order of DFEK' Within the lower Grube! Lloyd (GL) sample. 
2vi ranked in increasing order of GL within the higher GL sample. 
3 vi ranked in increasing order of DFER within the higher GL sample. 
4 Differnce in Factor Endowment Ratio. 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
Table 2.8: Correlation Matrix 
Variables MiJt yityjt;yrt LL'j CL'j Col'j Contigij DiJ 
Miit 1 
yityjt/yrt 0.49 1 
LL'j -0.051 -0.0604 1 
CL'j -0.0201 -0.053 0.0352 1 
Colij 0.0914 0.218 -0.0153 0.0106 1 
Contig'j 0.1638 0.0134 0.0651 0.1205 0.1093 1 
D'j -0.1378 0.0459 -0.0403 0.0058 -0.1105 -0.4479 1 
Chapter 2. The Implications of HO and IRS Theories in Sub-Saharan African Trade 63 
Table 2.9: Countries List by Region 
ASIA EU-NAM LAC MENA SSA 
Mghanistan Albania Argentina Algeria Angola 
Australia Austria Bahamas, The Bahrain Benin 
Bangladesh Belgium Barbados Djibouti Burkina Faso 
Brunei Canada Belize Egypt Burundi 
Cambodia Croatia Bolivia Iran Cameroon 
Hong Kong Cyprus Brazil Israel Cape Verde 
China Czech Rep. Chile Jordan CAF 
Fiji Denmark Colombia Kuwait Chad 
India Finland Costa Rica Lebanon Comoros 
Indonesia France Dominican Rep. Libya DRC 
Japan Germany Ecuador Mauritania Congo, Rep. 
Korea, Rep. Greece El Salvador Morocco Cote d'Ivoire 
Lao Hungary Guatemala Oman Equatorial Guinea 
Malaysia Iceland Guyana Qatar Ethiopia 
Maldives Ireland Haiti Saudi Arabia Gabon 
Moldova Italy Jamaica Sri Lanka Gambia 
Nepal Malta Mexico Tunisia Ghana 
New Zealand Netherlands Nicaragua Emirates Guinea 
Pakistan Norway Panama Guinea-Bissau 
PNG Poland Paraguay Kenya 
Philippines Portugal Peru Liberia 
Singapore Romania Suriname Madagascar 
Solomon Islands Slovak Rep. Tonga Malawi 
Thailand Slovenia TTO Mali 
Vanuatu Spain Uruguay Mauritius 
Vietnam Sweden Venezuela Mozambique 
Switzerland Niger 
Turkey Rwanda 
United Kingdom Senegal 
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Table 2.10: Estimating Equation (4) by Inc:reasing" Order of Education1 of the 
Importing Country 
All !I= 1 ll= 2 !I= 3 
VARIABLES log(M'i') log(M'i') log(M'i') log(M'i') 
log(Yityit /Yrt) 0.08*** 0.003*** 0.08*** 0.04*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
LL'i -0.8** 0.001 0.05 -0.28 
(0.35) (Oc006) (0.24) (0.40) 
Contig'i 3.47*** 0.03*** -0.44 1.51 *** 
(0.51) (0.01) (0.32) (0.44) 
CL'i 0.15 0.01 0.03 -0.87**** 
(0.29) (0.01) (0.19) (0.25) 
Col'1 -4.75*** 0.40*** -0.32 -0.25 
(1.08) (0.05) (1.44) (0.97) 
log(Dist'i) -1.36*** -0.002** -0.34*** -0.31 ** 
(0.175) (0.00436) (0.123) (0.139) 
Constant 11.21 *** 0.02 2.76*** 3.16*** 
(1.38) (0.036) (0.99) (1.08) 
Observations 5,204 1,041 1,043 1,039 
Number of Groups 2,678 592 672 683 
1The total proportiOn of people aged from 15 and above m the tertiary school1s used. 
2The lower v, the lower the proportion of people in the tertiary school. 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
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Table 2.11: Estimating Equation (4) by Inereasing2 Order of Education' of the 
Exporting Country 
V= 1 v= 2 V= 3 v= 4 
VARIABLES log(M'J') log(M'J') log(M'1') log(M'1') 
Log(Y''yJt /Yr') 0.17*** 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
LL'J 0.003 -0.21 -0.29 -0.16 
(0.02) (0.44) (0.28) (0. 72) 
Contig'J 0.02 1.3** 1.6*** 5.2*** 
(0.03) (0.63) (0.37) (0.84) 
CL'J -0.02 0.5 -0.6*** -0.2 
(0.02) (0.36) (0.21) (0.50) 
Cot'J 0.25** -0.39 0.20 -3.86*** 
(0.12) (2.74) (0.89) (1.39) 
log( dist'J) -0.003*** -0.07*** -0.32*** -1.54*** 
(0.01) (0.23) (0.12) (0.30) 
Constant 0.02 0.37 3.1 *** 12.5*** 
(0.09) (1.92) (0.91) (2.27) 
Observations 1,041 1,041 1,040 1,040 
Number of Groups 608 691 680 660 
1The total proportion of people aged from 15 and above m the tertiary school1s used. 
2The lower v, the lower the proportion of people in the tertiary school. 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
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Table 2.12: Estimating Equation (4) by Inc:reasing2 Order of the Sum1 of 
Educations of the Importing and Exporting Countries 
v= 1 V= 2 V- 3 v= 4 ll= 5 
VARIABLES log(M'i') log(M'i') log(M'i') log(Miit) log(M'i') 
Log(Y''Yi' /Yr') 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.11 *** 
(0.01) (0.002) (0.01) (0.003) (0.003) 
LL'i 0.004 0.006 -0.29 0.27 -2.10 
(0.002) (0.07) (0.55) (0.52) (1.59) 
Contig'i 0.016*** -0.000** 3.358*** 3.93*** 18.26*** 
(0.004) (0.09) (0.66) (0.69) (2.33) 
CL'i 0.000496 -0.109** 0.368 -0.495 2.403* 
(0.00229) (0.0516) (0.380) (0.394) (1.300) 
Col'i -0.25 -1.7 -0.26 -10.8*** 
(0.27) (1.56) (1.16) (2. 70) 
Log( dist'i) -0.006*** -0.11 *** -0.06*** -1.2*** -3.4*** 
(0.002) (0.034) (0.220) (0.25) (0.56) 
Constant 0.043*** 0.95*** 0.63 9.76*** 28.17*** 
(0.013) (0.28) (1.68) (1.9) ( 4.52) 
Observations 1,041 1,041 1,040 1,040 1,042 
Number of Groups 540 644 677 704 651 
1The sum of the total proportiOn of people aged from 15 and above m tertiary schools m the two countnes. 
2The lower the sum of the proportions of people in tertiary schools, the lower v. 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
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2.8 Figures 
Agricultural Goods Manufactured GOOdS] 
Figure 2.1: Value Share of Agricultural and Manufactured Goods in total NOn-Oil 
Imports in SSA 
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Figure 2.2: Nominal Value of Imports within SSA 
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Figure 2.4: The Ratio of within SSA Imports to SSA's Imports from the Rest of the 
World 
Chapter 3 
Property Rights and Economic 





The importance of institutions in the process of economic development has been 
emphasized in the field of development economics, especially after the publication of 
the Nobel Laureates North, Douglas's Institutions (1991). North (1991) defines insti-
tutions as "humanly devised constraints {formal and informal) that structure political, 
economic and social interactions". Institutions mainly affect the economic outcomes 
through the economic incentives they alter in citizens to engage in productive activities. 
Both, informal and formal constraints (institutions) are shown to have strong effects 
on economic performances. For instance, informal institutions related to social capital 
such as norms, civic cooperation and trust are shown to be associated with stronger 
economic performance (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Putnam, 1993). 
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Nevertheless, particular attention has been devoted to the impacts of formal 
institutions on economic development. On one hand, some researches focus on the cor-
relation between economic development and political risk factors including government 
stability, democratic accountability, bureaucracy, and corruption. There is a consen-
sus that economies prosper in the environments where political institutions constraint 
government actions (e.g., Rodrick et al., 2004). Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) show a 
strong correlation between corporate governance and political governance. Faria and 
Mauro (2009) argue that weak institutions can deteriorate foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and consequently the economic progress. Their supporting argument is that 
before investing in a country, a foreign fum considers the degree of political tension, 
transparency in the corporate sector, and the probability of exposure to corruption. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993); Mauro (1995) warn that corruption lowers economic per-
formance. Works like Barro (1997), Easterly and Ross (1997), and Keefer and Knack, 
(2002) show that government stability and government spending are crucial to economic 
prosperity. 
On the other hand, the emphasis is on property rights institutions. North 
(1990) argues that countries where property rights are well defined, secured and en-
forced by state laws tend to experience higher economic performances. According to 
North, secured and enforced private property rights reduce transaction costs in ex-
change and produce economic incentives, given the expectations that assets will not be 
expropriated. In fact, the presence of an efficient judicial system to enforce the third 
party interests (contracts) generates investment incentives which lead to competition, 
technological innovations and new opportunities. Secured private property rights are 
argued to induce more investment in physical and human capital (e.g., Jones, 1981), 
whereas, human capital is an important determinant of growth (Romer, 1990). 
Although the correlations between property rights and economic outcome have · 
received great attention, different measures of property rights are used in the literature 
and the sample countries on which they are examined differ across papers. For instance, 
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under the assumption of aJJ overlapping generation, Zak ( 2002) constructs a growth 
model in which property rights are unsecured and costly to enforce. In the model, the 
proxy for weak property rights is the access of workers to expropriation technology by 
which they can accumulate resources from the capital owners (i.e., violate the property 
rights of the owner). Zak {2002) finds that the imperfect protection of property rights 
reduces growth and perpetuates poverty. Acemuglu eta!., (2001) uses settler mortality 
as a proxy for property right institutions and estimate the impacts of these institutions 
on income per capita. 
Despite the unanimity about the effects of property rights on economic per-
formance, the magnitude of these effects has not yet been measured, at least for the 
exclusive sample of SSA countries. Studying the effects of property rights on the basis 
of regional average or by grouping all developing countries in a single sample can be 
misleading. Such averages mitigate the wide heterogeneity between countries within 
regions and across regions regarding the levels of property rights and the degrees of 
their enforcement. For a particular region like SSA, there exist large differences in the 
level and the legal enforcement of property rights across the countries. On one extreme, 
in SSA, Zimbabwe has the lowest average property rights score1 (21.66) over the period 
from 1995 to 2007. On the other, Botswana has the largest average (70) over the same 
period. Different levels of property rights exist in between. 
I subdivide SSA countries to identify the magnitude of the effects of property 
rights on the total factor productivity (TFP), and to see whether the sizes of the effects 
vary or are uniform across income groups and property rights levels. The paper uses a 
model in which TFP depends on human capital and different institutional measures2 
including property rights. This model allows identifying the effects of property rights on 
11 use the property rights score database by the ''Heritage Foundation" in this paper. The com-
ponent "property rights'' of the economic freedo:ffi database refers to private property rights creation 
and protection by state enforced laws. Property rights scores are assigned from zero to one hundred, 
with higher scores indicating greater existence and enforcement of private property rights. 
2Political risks indicators - variables from the international country risk guide database (ICRG) 
and some economic freedom variables - property rights and government spending. 
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TFP relative to that of the human capital and the other institutional measures. Twenty 
SSA countries are grouped into sub-samples by the property rights benchmark3 and 
by income level benchmark.4 The model estimation is performed on the whole sample 
and the sub-samples. 
I estimate how different institutions affect the TFP because the TFP has been 
pointed out in the literature to explain most of the variation in the development gap 
across countries. In fact, a number of papers in the field of development economics 
question whether the cross-country differences in per worker income stem from the 
differences in factor input or the differences in the TFP (that is the difference in the 
efficiency of the use of these factor inputs). To assess whether the factor input or 
output accounts the most for income disparity, the development accounting quantifies 
the relationship where income is a function of factor input and output: Income = 
F(input, TFP) (Caselli, 2005). The empirical finding suggests at the unanimity that 
the total factor productivity accounts for more than 50 percent of the development gap 
(Denison, 1962, 1967; King and Levine, 1994, Easterly and Levine, 2001; Caselli 2005). 
Given the importance of the TFP in the process of growth, any determinant factor to the 
TFP would also be determinant in explaining the development gap or economic growth 
differences. Thus, I examine whether property rights and other institutional measures 
matter to the change in the TFP. In addition, the total factor productivity includes 
the labor productivity. Therefore, it can be used to describe the production function; 
whereas, the process of growth depends on the shape of the production function (Barro 
3The average regional property right score from 1995 to 2007 is used as the property rights bench-
mark based on which the countries are subdivided into two sub-samples: the lower and the upper 
benchmark sub-samples. The average regional property rights score from 1995 to 2007 is equal42.92). 
Countries with average property right score below this average are classified in the lower benchmark 
sub-sample. Those with the average score greater than the benchmark level are grouped in the upper 
benchmark sub-sample. 
4The benchmark for the income sub-samples is the average regional income per capita over the 
period from 1995 to 2007. This average is 2767 using World Development Data (WDI). Countries 
with the average income per capita less than the regional average are grouped in the lower income 
sub-group and those with the average RGDP per capita greater than the regional average are classified 
in the upper income sub-sample. 
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and Sala-i-Martin, 2003). 
The choice of the SSA countries for this analysis stems from three main rea-
sons. The first is the wide heterogeneity that exists among SSA countries in respect to 
property rights and income. The second reason is the overall lower average property 
rights of SSA compared to that of other regions. From 1995 to 2010, the lowest average 
regional property rights score was recorded in SSA. The third reason is that SSA lags 
in terms of the per capita GDP over time. The average regional GDP per capita and 
the average regional property rights scores are distinctly lower in SSA relative to those 
of other regions (Appendix Figure, 1, 2). I examine the magnitude of the effects of 
property rights on TFP for the sample of 20 SSA countries using data over the period 
from 1995 to 2007. Note that 1995 is the year when the first data on property rights 
were made available. The countries included in the analysis are those with full data 
over the entire period. 
The main contribution of this paper is to show the sizes of the effects of property 
rights on the TFP across different income groups and different levels of property rights 
in SSA. In general, in SSA the change in private property rights has a positive and 
strong effect on the TFP. As the total factor productivity is an indicator of economic 
growth, this correlation between private property rights and the TFP suggests that 
property rights reforms in SSA will enhance the economic growth in the region. The 
remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives an overview of the 
history of the emergence of property rights. Section 3 provides the data description 
and the model. Section 4 presents the results and their interpretation while section 5 
concludes the paper. 
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3.3 The History and the Point of Divergence in the 
Paths of Nations' Development 
The evolution of legal property rights and taxation in America and Great Britain 
(common law countries) can be traced throughout diverse agreements, declaration,5 
and the philosophical views of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-
1704). For Hobbes, property rights protection must be enforced by a strong sovereign, 
while Lock supports that property rights are morally above any government claim. 
According to Locke, by applying their labor to things of nature, one could acquire 
property rights (John Lock's second treatise on civil government, 1689). Even though 
these two philosophical views are diametrically opposed, both authors agreed that 
property rights protection must be the objective of any society. The basis for the civic 
law can be found in the Napoleonic code adopted during the French revolution of 1789-
1795. This code constitutes the constitutional document for the French and other civic 
law countries. The civic law is simply the expansion of state power and is opposed 
to custom and common law. However, under both, the common and the civic laws, 
property rights are well defined and have been the driving force of economic expansion 
in Europe and North America. 
The effective existence of property rights gives economic incentives; it is a 
fundamental stimulus for citizens to engage in productive activities. In "reflections 
on French revolutions", Burke6 wrote the following: " ... The power of perpetuating 
our property in our families is one of the most valuable and 'interesting circumstances 
belonging to it, and that which tends the most to the perpetuation of society itself It 
makes our weakness subservient to our virtue; it grafts benevolence even upon avarice". 
This thought endorses the multiplicative incentive that property rights provide. When 
5The agreement of the people (1649), the English declaration of rights (1689), the Virginia Bill of 
Rights (1776), the Declaration of Independence (1776), the Northwest Ordinance (1787), and the U.S. 
Constitution (1787). 
6See full text at http:/ jwww.blupete.com/Literature/EssaysjBluePete/PropertyRights.htm. 
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one has the legal rights on her asset(s) and knows that these assets can be legally 
transferred to her children, she will have incentive to work hard to increase her stocks 
of assets, to enjoy it and leave valuable bequest to her future generations. The type of 
property rights philosophy that was nourished in the West and North America is what 
allowed and continue to ensure economic expansion in these regions. 
Even though there were many similarities between earlier societies of Europe 
and Africa, the ideology of property rights as a social need was not developed in many 
Sub-Saharan African societies. This discrepancy makes a huge difference in the paths of 
economic developments between SSA and the other regions. For instance, about more 
than two hundred years earlier, some African kingdoms like the kingdom of Aksum 7 
(the actual Ethiopia) and the kingdom of "Kongo" (the actual Democratic Republic 
of Congo), were as much as powerful and rich as the then Great Britain. The Aksum 
kingdom especially had its own written language and was able to mint coins and suc-
cessfully traded with some other regions. During these eras, in the most prosperous 
African and European kingdoms the social structures tended to be more absolutist and 
based on slavery and serfdom institutions. However, the path of the nations' history 
diverged from the point where reforms in social organization took place in Europe and 
expanded to North America while in Africa the absolutism continued to reign. 
Great Britain's 1640 civil war and the revolution of 1688 drove the demise of 
slavery, serfdom and all types of social and political absolutism. The end of absolutism 
in Europe, allowed the emergence of property rights, labor market institutions and 
people's accession to lands. These new ideologies and mentalities in Europe spilled over 
to America. The access to lands and the introduction of property rights institutions 
created competition and the incentives to improve the properties and receive the most 
fruits of them. 8 
Robinson (2010) argues that as slavery, serfdom and absolutism continued in 
7See full history about the Aksum kingdom at http:/ /sharepoint.chiles.leon.kl2.fl.us/mcneilt/Textbook 
8See detailed test at http:/ fwww.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/5352. 
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Africa, no economic incentive for property improvement was created. In contrast, peo-
ple tend to work less to reduce the amount of their labor that will be expropriated by 
the rulers. There were no incentive to stimulate research and discoveries. In this con-
test Acemoglu (2005) stated that industrialization did not take place where extractive 
institutions were established. Citizens have no incentive to engage in creative activities 
as they will not enjoy the fruits of their efforts. But, the rulers (expropriators) are less 
likely to come up with ideas that generate new technologies. Expropriation9 or lack of 
property rights explains why Africans took the opposite development path compared to 
Europeans. The history and some investigations on contemporaneous African countries 
endorse the fact that property rights are nascent and still weakly secured in different 
points of SSA region. For instance, Joireman (2007) points that property rights are not 
well defined in SSA and argues that customary laws and the status of women are the 
main impediment to property rights enforcement in the region. The lack of strongly 
enforced property rights might explain the lower level of incomes across the region. 
3.4 The Model and Data Description 
3.4.1 Data Description 
The analysis in this paper covers a panel of twenty (20) SSA countries10 from 
1995 to 2007. The variables11 used are real GDP, the attainable education as a proxy 
9 James Robinson (2(HO) wrote " ... to have become more prosperous, the Kongolese would need to 
have saved and invested in plows, for example. But this would not have been worthwhile in that any 
extra output they produced by using plows and wheels would have been expropriated by the king and his 
lords. Many people's property rights were highly unsecured; many moved their villages away from roads 
so as to reduce the incidence of plunder." In these circumstances, parliaments, rather than creating 
patent laws, were motivated to fight the king and defeat absolutism. 
10Botswana (BWA), Cameroon (CMR), Gabon (GAB), Gambia (GMB), Ghana (GHA), Ivory Cost 
(CN), Kenya (KEN), Malawi (MWI), Mali (MLI), Mozambique (MOZ), Namibia (NAM), Niger 
(NER), Republic of Congo (COG), Senegal (SEN), Sierrar Leone (SLE), South Africa (ZAF), Tanzania 
(TZA), Togo (TGO), Uganda (UGA), Zambia (ZMB), Zimbabwe (ZWE). 
11The tables of the summary statistics and the correlation tables of the variables are given in the 
Table section. 
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for the human capital or technology, capital stock and different sets of institutional 
quality measures. The choice of countries and the data period is driven by the data 
availability. Countries included are those with data available on key variables over 
the entire period. "Property rights" is the main institutional variable of interest in 
this paper. The data on property rights is retrieved from the Heritage Foundation's 
economic freedom database. 12 The methodologies used to compute the property rights 
scores are complex and reflect property rights creation and enforcement. The details 
about the computation can be found at the institution's website. 
The variables - government stability, ethnic tension, internal and external con-
flict, bureaucracy, and corruption are the political risk components and they are re-
trieved from the international country risk guide "ICRG". The measurement method-
ologies of these variables can be found on the ICRG's website. All the indexes of the 
economic freedom, and the ICRG are compiled using complex methodologies including 
statistical models to give sufficient credibility to the data (see the different sources of 
these indexes). 
I constructed the data on capital stock using the perpetual inventory equation: 
K,, = I,,+ (1 - o)K,,_1 , where K,, is the current capital stock of country i; K,,_1 is 
the capital stock of the previous period. o is the depreciation rate of capital. I, is the 
current real aggregate investment in purchasing power parity and it is computed as 
follows: lit= RGDPL,, x POP,, x KI,,, where RGDPL,, is the real income per capita 
(Laspeyres), POP,, is the current population of country i and K I,, is the investment 
share in total income. The perpetual inventory method is a method of updating data 
12The Heritage Foundation defines property rights as: an assessment of the ability of individuals 
to accumulate private property secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state. Property 
rights measures the degree to which a country's laws protect private property rights and the degree to 
which its government enforces those laws. It also assesses the likelihood that private properties will 
be expropriated and analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within the 
judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. The scores of property 
rights are ranked from zero to hundred. The more certain the legal protections of properties in a 
country, the higher the country's PR score. Similarly, the greater the chances that the country's 
government will expropriate properties, the lower score the country's PR score. Intermediate scores 
are attributed to countries that fall between two categories. 
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that has been widely used in the literature. For instance, Caselli and Feyrer (2007) 
used the perpetual inventory equation to update the data on capital stock for countries. 
Barro and Lee (2010) uses this methodology to assess the current flow of adult people 
added to the existing stock of the educational attainment. The depreciation rate is 
set at 6 percent following the literature. The initial capital stock is computed as: 
KiO = Ii0/(g,1+15), where I;o is the value of investment series in the first year. In general, 
the average geometric growth g,, is computed as the average growth rate between the 
first year of data availability and 1970. The reason is before the 1970, capital stocks 
were roughly at their steady state (see Solow, 1956). However, for the SSA countries 
the first year of data availability is 1950. Thus, g,, is calculated between 1950 and 1970. 
The data on the investment share in total income is taken from the Penn 
World Tables (PWT. Version 7). For the data on the human capital, I use the updated 
educational attainment data by Barro and Lee (2010), for the population aged 15 and 
plus. The data on the real GDP, labor force and population are retrieved from the 
World Bank's world development indicators (WDI). All variables are purchasing power 
parity (PPP) converted to allow international comparison. The indexes are in level 
value. 
3.4.2 The Models 
The model estimated in this paper correlates is the model where the TFP in a 
country is a function of the human capital available, the degree of property rights, 
government spending, socio economic conditions, corruption, the extent of internal and 
external conflicts, bureaucracy and government stability. This model is estimated to 
examine the effects of property rights on the total factor productivity (TFP) across the 
property rights groups and income groups of SSA. I first compute the TFP based on 
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Coe and Helpman (1995) as follows: 
log(A,,) = log(Y;,)- odog(K,,) - (1- a)log(L,,) (3.1) 
where Ait is the total factor productivity, lit is the output, K,, is the capital stock, 
and L,, is the labor force. The magnitudes of the coefficients of capital and labor 
are found in the literature to be: a = 1/3 and (1 -a) = 2/3. To assess the effects 
of property rights on the TFP, I estimate equation (2) below using the fixed effects 
estimation methodologies across the property rights groups and the income groups. I 
present the results of this estimation in Table l. 
Log(A,,) = { 1log(Edue;,) + 12log(PR;,) + {slog(GSP;,) + {4GST;, + {5Corit + 
/BSEC,,+{7IC,,+i8EC,,+i9 Bur,,+Eit (2), 
where log(A;,) is the log of the total factor productivity, Edue;, P R;,, GSP,,, CST,,, 
Corit, SEC,,, IC,,, EC,,, ET;, and Bur,, represent respectively the educational attain-
ment (used as a proxy for the human capital), property rights, government spending, 
government stability, corruption, socio-economic condition, internal conflict, external 
conflict, ethnic tension, and bureaucracy of country i at time t. 
The choice of the institutional variables included is driven by the collinearity 
between the variables. Moreover, I include variables upon consideration of the omitted 
variables bias and model specification error issues. The question of the consistency 
of the parameter estimates is one of the recently debated issues over the results of 
empirical analyses- especially when dealing with panel data analysis and the effects of 
one variable on another. The inconsistency of parameter estimates can stream from the 
existence of simultaneity, endogeneity or omitted variables within the panel (see Stock 
and Watson 1993; Baltagi, 2010). The debate over the inconsistency of parameters 
has led for instance Coe et a!. (2009) to revise Coe and Helpman (1995) in examining 
the effects of research and development (R&D) capital on factor productivity. The 
new econometric methodologies recently employed to deal with these issues are the 
Chapter 3. Property llights and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan African 80 
panel co-integration techniques. Coe et a!. (2009) argue that panel co-integration 
increases the consistency of the parameter estimates and provides robust coefficient 
to the simultaneity, endogeneity or omitted variables problems. The authors perform 
the unit root and co-integration tests of the dependent and independent variables. 
The unit root test allows using the first difference of the dependent variable if the null 
hypothesis of unit root is not rejected13 The co-integration test captures whether there 
is a long-run stable relationship between the dependent variable and the independent 
variable(s) within the panel of countries. Given the possibility of eventual simultaneity, 
endogeneity or omitted variables problems within the panel, I perfoqned the unit root 
and co-integration tests for the variables used in equation (2) specified above using the 
methodologies of Levin et a!. (2002) and Pedroni (2001). Based on the econometric 
tests results, I estimate equation 2 using the fixed estimation methodology. 
3.5 Results and Interpretation 
The investigation on property rights across Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries 
reveals the importance of property rights in the economic performance of SSA countries. 
Across the sub-groups classified by property rights levels and income levels, property 
rights have a positive and statistically significant effect on the total factor productivity 
(TFP). Property rights explain at least 0.2 percent of the variation in TFP in SSA. 
This effect is economically large. Given the standard deviation of 0.4 in the log of 
property rights in SSA, a 1 -standard deviation in the change in property rights leads 
to 0.08 proportionate rise or 8 percent increase in the TFP. 
Within the classification by property rights levels, the change in property rights 
explain 0.3 percent of the variation in the total factor productivity (TFP) under the 
upper sub-sample and 0.2 percent for the lower sub-sample, both at 95 percent con-
13The null hypothesis of unit root is rejected if the test statistic is significant (see Levin et al., 2002; 
Im et a!. 2003; Coe et a!., 2009). 
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fidence. For the classification by incomes, a one percent increase in property rights 
is associated with 0.2 percent increase in TFP for both sub-income groups. However, 
for the upper income group, this effect is at a 99 percent level of statistical confidence 
while for the lower sub- sample the effect is at a 90 percent level of confidence (Table 
1). 
The estimation results show two important facts about property rights in SSA. 
First, there is a difference in the effects of property rights on TFP across the sub-
groups within each classification type. Secondly, the differences in these effects are not 
very large between the sub-groups within each classification type and between the two 
classification types. In fact, the estimation result reveals a remarkable pattern of the 
effects of property rights on the TFP between the sub-samples within each classification 
parameter. Within the classification by income level, the significance of the effect of 
property rights on the TFP decreases from the upper sub-group to the lower one, 
but the size of the effect remains constant (0.2 percent at 99 percent significance for 
the upper sub-sample and 0.2 percent at a 90 percent level of confidence). In the 
classification by property rights levels, even though the statistical significance does not 
vary, the size of the effect of property rights on the TFP decreases from the upper 
sub-sample to the lower sub-sample (0.3 percent at a 95 percent level of confidence in 
the upper sub-sample and 0.24 percent at a 95 level of confidence for the lower sub-
sample) (Table 1). There seems to be pronounced effects (in the magnitude or the 
statistical significance) of property rights on TFP where property rights are relatively 
better and where incomes are relatively higher. In contrast, the effects are either lower 
statistically or in magnitude in countries with lower income a.nd countries with lower 
levels of property rights (lower sub-samples under both types of classification). 
These changes in the effects of property rights on TFP across the lower and the 
upper sub-samples highlights two important facts. First, in countries with relatively 
higher incomes, property rights have significant impacts on the TFP. From this first 
fact, it is ambiguous whether property rights are contributing to the growth of the TFP 
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or whether the effects are due to the income level. This fact suggests that relatively 
higher income countries have better property rights or countries with better property 
rights have better incomes. Whether higher income leads to better property rights or 
better property rights provide higher income is hard to untangle and is uncovered in 
this paper. It might be the case that both matter. The second fact is that better 
defined and secured private property rights have higher impacts on TFP. This second 
fact clearly sheds light on the importance of private property rights in the growth 
of TFP. Thus, property rights reforms will highly contribute in enhancing economic 
growth in SSA. 
Despite the differences in the effects of property rights on TFP across countries 
within SSA, these di!ferences are not too large; both between the groups within the same 
classification and across the classifications. This second remark from the investigation 
results points out that SSA there is no big difference in income levels across SSA 
countries and the levels of property rights do not vary too much across countries within 
this region. This revelation on the non-large difference in income and property rights 
in SSA together with the fact property rights matter for the growth of TFP, answer the 
question why the SSA countries lag in economic development. Indeed, most of the SSA 
countries have lower incomes (15 countries out of 20 countries in the data sample have 
their average income per capita below the regional average.) and weakly defined and 
enforced private property rights (about half of the countries have an average property 
rights below the regional average. The averages of the others slightly surpasses the 
regional average.) 
Even though not too large, the variation in the effects of property rights on the 
TFP across the sub-income and property rights groups in SSA are an indication that 
property rights matters for growth. Countries with relatively higher property rights 
experience higher effects on the growth of the TFP. Given the finding of previous 
empirical works emphasizing that TFP explains most of the variations in the cross 
country differences in income per worker, the strong and positive correlation between 
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property rights and TFP demonstrates that property rights Property rights reforms will 
enhance growth in SSA. Most importantly, these reforms are needed in most countries 
in the region. 
The overall results of this paper highlight that property rights are important de-
terminants in the process of economic development in SSA. The access to enforced pri-
vate property rights will accelerate the economic growth of SSA countries. In practice, 
the effect of property rights enforcement on growth has been experienced in Botswana. 
Figure 3 shows the correlation between the property right scores in 2005 and the av-
erage investment per capita over the period from 2005 to 2009 in some SSA countries. 
In this correlation ·graph, Botswana lies at the upper right. In fact, Botswana has 
experienced a substantially high growth relative to other SSA countries in recent years. 
Although different factors might have contributed to this success, many economists be-
lieve that the private property rights protection policy of Botswana is the main driver 
of its high growth. Devarajan, Easterly and PaCk (2003) write that "the government of 
Botswana clearly convened it would protect private property rights". The paper states 
further that the political stability in addition to the relative low corruption and press 
freedom made Botswana attractive for investment. In short, private property rights 
enforcement matters in stimulating investment and hence the economic growth. 
These conclusions are robust with respect to civil liberties. The impacts of the 
civil rights on the total factor productivity are similar to those of property rights. I 
use the civil right from the "freedom in the world" database to check the robustness 
of the effects of property rights on the TFP. Civil Liberties are measured on a one-to-
seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest. 
This implies that the higher the score the least degree of civil liberties. Thus, if better 
civil liberties improve the TFP, one would expect negative and statistically significant 
coefficients for this variable in the regression. I subdivided the country sample into 
lower civil liberties sub-group (civil liberties scores of 1, 2, and 3) and an upper civil 
liberty sub-group (scores of 4, 5, 6, and 7). As shown in Appendix Table 4, the effects 
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of civil liberties on the TFP are large and statistically significant in both sub-samples. 
The increase in the scores lowers TFP. It is remarkable that the coefficient is lager in 
the sub-group of the lower civil liberties. This indicates that TFP in these countries will 
dramatically decline in these countries for a given percentage drop in the civil liberties. 
While, in the upper sub-group, the same proportional change in the civil liberties will 
have less adverse effect. 
Civil liberties and property rights are components of individuals' rights. These 
rights when available and enforced by state laws, they give incentive to citizens to 
engage in productive activities and to contribute to their countries' economic growth. 
The results on the effects of civil liberties on the TFP confirm the importance of private 
property rights in the process of economic growth. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This paper mainly shows that the lack of property rights is an impediment to the 
economic growth of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. Improving property rights 
would significantly increase the total factor productivity (TFP) within the SSA region 
in general. Even though some differences exist, the countries in SSA do not differ to 
a large extent in their incomes and property rights levels. Moreover, the income and 
property rights levels are lower in the region. Given the finding of this paper, that 
property rights are important determinants of TFP growth and the finding of previous 
works that TFP accounts for a large proportion of the development gap across countries, 
this paper recommends private property rights reforms in SSA. The creation of private 
property rights and their enforcement by clear state laws would contribute to SSA's 
economic growth. 
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3. 7 Regression Tables 
Table 3.1: The Effects of Property Rights on the Total Factor Productivity 
P R 1 Groups Inc? Groups 
Whole Upper 
FE FE 
VAR. log(TFP,,) log(TFP,,) 
log(Edue;,) 0.8*** 0.8** 
(0.24) (0.34) 
log(PRit) 0.22*** 0.30** 
(0.07) (0.13) 
log(GSP,,) 0.02 0.13 
(0.19) (0.23) 
ET;, -0.18*** -0.12** 
(0.03) (0.04) 
Bur it -0.07* 0.003 
(0.04) (0.06) 
SEC,, 0.05*** 0.08*** 
(0.02) (0.03) 
Cor,, 0.05* -0.03 
(0.03) (0.04) 
EC,, 0.03 0.04* 
(0.02) (0.02) 
!Cit 0.02 0.01 
(0.01) (0.02) 
CST;, 0.01 -0.005 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Const. 0.3 -0.9 
(1.13) (1.64) 
Obs. 246 138 
R-sq. 0.20 0.15 
Groups 20 11 
1 Property Rights Groupsj 2fucome Groups 
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: The Whole Sample 
Var. Obs Mean Stendard Deviation Min Max 
Log(TFPu) 258 2.5 0.5 0.9 4.5 
log(Y,tf L,,) 260 8.5 0.8 7.1 10.3 
log(Educit) 260 1.4 0.6 -0.1 2.2 
log( FR.;,) 247 3.7 0.4 2.3 4.2 
log(GSPit) 247 4.4 0.2 3.8 4.6 
log(K,tf Lit) 258 5.7 1.0 3.6 8.3 
GST;, 260 8.9 1.8 3.3 11.1 
SEC,, 260 4.1 1.4 1.5 8.0 
ETit 260 3.6 1.0 1.5 5.0 
!Cit 260 9.0 1.6 1.3 12.0 
EC,, 260 10.2 1.4 4.6 12.0 
cor it 260 2.4 0.9 0.0 5.0 
Bur it 260 1.4 0.9 0.0 3.5 
Table 3.3: Correlation Table: The Whole Sample 
Var. Log(TFPit) log(Yit) log(Educit) log(P R,,) log(GSPit) log(Kit/ Lit) 
Log(TFPit) 1.0 
log(Y;,) 0.1 1.0 
log(Educ,,) 0.1 0.5 1.0 
log(P R,,) 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.0 
log(GSPit) 0.0 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 1.0 
log(Kit/ Lit) -0.3 0.8 0.5 0.2 -0.4 1.0 
GSTit 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 
SECit 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.2 
ETit 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.4 0.2 
I Cit 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.4 0.3 
CST;, SECit ET;, 
1.0 
0.0 1.0 
0.0 0.2 1.0 
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Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 

























The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Figure 3.1: Average Regional Real GDP per Capita 
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